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INTRODUCTION 1
Online gambling is by its nature a cross-border activity. As
gambling is generally considered a socially dangerous and
somewhat disreputable form of entertainment, countries that
are now Member States of the European Union have regulated
gambling for centuries in order to protect various social
interests and to generate tax revenues.2 Over the years, various
1 . For the purpose of consistency, this Note adopts the Treaty of Lisbon
numbering throughout, even when discussing cases decided under the Treaties of
Rome or Amsterdam numbering. This Note also refers to the European Union and EU
law when discussing cases decided before the European Union was formed, and refers
to the Court of Justice of the European Union as the CJEU rather than the pre-Lisbon
ECJ. The names of books or articles using pre-Lisbon terminology have not been
changed.
2. See, e.g., SPORTS BETTING: LAW AND POLICY 28–29 (Paul M. Anderson, Ian S.
Blackshaw & Robert C.R. Siekmann eds., 2011) (discussing traditional conceptions of
gambling as associated with fraud, crime, and moral disrepute); see also CRIME,
ADDICTION AND THE REGULATION OF GAMBLING 1 (Cyrille Fijnaut, Alan Littler & Toine
Spapens eds., 2008) (observing that national governments have regulated gambling for
centuries based on dual arguments that it is best to channel the activity and that
revenue ought to be directed towards the public interest); 8 AMBROSE BIERCE, THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF AMBROSE BIERCE (1909-1912) (“The gambling known as
business looks with austere disfavor upon the business known as gambling.”). Advocate
General (“AG”) Dámaso Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer also explored gambling’s pervasive
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European national governments have developed widely differing
methods of regulating gambling. 3 The European Union,
however, has sought to create a centralized system of gambling
regulation that accommodates the free trade goals of the Treaty
of Lisbon and the diverse policy objectives of the individual
Member States. 4 One reasonably might argue that online
gambling should be regulated at the EU level in order to assure
the fundamental freedoms promised by the Internal Market. At
the same time, while gambling is an economically significant
industry, it implicates socially sensitive issues like the
squandering of money, addiction to gambling, and organized
crime.5
The conflict between the economic objectives of the
borderless, supra-national trading zone and the national social
objectives that the gambling industry affects is evident in the
Court of Justice of the European Union’s (the “CJEU”)
preliminary rulings regarding the compatibility of national
presence in literature in his Opinion citing works by Cervantes, Dostoevsky,
Chateaubriand, and Kant. Joined Cases 338, 359 & 360/04, Opinion of Advocate
General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, Massimiliano Placanica and Others (“Placanica”), [2007]
E.C.R. I-1894, ¶ 95 nn. 58–62. Each case before the CJEU is assigned an AG to research
independently and deliver a non-binding opinion to the CJEU, and it is considered
unusual for the CJEU to depart from the AG’s opinion. ANTHONY ARNULL, THE
EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS COURT OF JUSTICE 14–15 (2d. ed. 2006); see Consolidated
Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 252 (ex art. 222
TEC), 2012 O.J. C 326/47, at 207 [hereinafter TFEU]; id. art. 253 (ex art. 223 TEC), at
208; TREVOR HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW 49–50 (7th ed.
2010) (describing AGs as independent representatives of the public like the French
commissaire du gouvernement).
3. See Commission of the European Communities, On On-line Gambling in the
Internal Market: Green Paper from the Commission to the European Council, COM
(2011) 128 final, at 3 (Mar. 24, 2011) [hereinafter Green Paper] (establishing there are
generally two regulatory models applied in the EU Member States: one based on a
controlled monopoly (often public) and the other based on licensed gambling
providers operating within a controlled regulatory scheme).
4. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, 2012 O.J. C 326/13
[hereinafter TEU post-Lisbon].
5. See Steve Scherer, INSIGHT–Italian Gaming Liberalisation: A Bet That Did Not Pay
Off, REUTERS (July 17, 2012, 6:01 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/17/
us-italy-gaming-idUSBRE86G0IJ20120717 (highlighting that 700,000 Italians are
addicted to gambling and the mafia uses legal gambling to launder billions of euros);
see also Tom Kingston, State and Mafia Take Their Cut As Italians Develop Gambling Habit,
GUARDIAN, Feb. 29, 2012. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/feb/29/statemafia-italy-gambling (describing how the economic crisis has driven many Italians to
gamble).
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gambling regulation with the objectives of the Internal Market. 6
A logical question, then, is whether the deferential treatment
granted to Member States in gambling regulation violates the
fundamental freedoms of the Internal Market and the Treaty of
Lisbon. The Treaty of Lisbon allows restrictions on the freedom
to provide services, provided the regulations do not discriminate
on the basis of nationality and are tailored to public policy,
public security, or public health objectives. 7 The CJEU has
recognized regulation of gambling to be a restriction on the
provision of services but generally allows such regulation in
deference to the Member States’ social policy objectives.8 Due to
political and social sensitivity, adoption of legislation by the
tricameral EU system, to date, has not been feasible.9 Thus, the
assessment of the compatibility of national gambling regulations
with EU law has been left to the CJEU.
Greater cooperation at the EU level would help Member
States more effectively achieve the objectives of consumer
protection and fraud prevention in regulation of online
gambling. Until EU-wide regulation becomes a feasible political
option, if it ever does, this Note argues that the CJEU should
undertake a specific and stringent judicial review in examining
6. See Hartley, supra note 2, at 47 (listing the number of judicial bodies that
compose the Court of Justice of the European Union: the Court of Justice, the General
Court, and the specialized courts); see also ARNULL supra note 2, at 5 (describing the
establishment of the CJEU in 1951 in the Treaty establishing the European Coal and
Steel Community and noting that under Article 31 the CJEU must ensure “that in the
interpretation and application of this Treaty, and of rules laid down for the
implementation thereof, the law is observed”).
7. See TFEU, supra note 2, art. 61 (ex art. 54 TEC), 2012 O.J. C 326, at 77
(allowing restrictions provided they do not discriminate on the basis of nationality); see
also id. art. 52 (ex art. 46 TEC), at 90 (allowing restrictions on the basis of public policy,
public security, and public health).
8. See, e.g., Her Majesty’s Customs and Excise v. Gerhart Schindler and Jörg
Schindler (“Schindler”), Case C-275/92, [1994] E.C.R. I-1078, ¶ 45 (holding that the
UK legislation is “an obstacle to the freedom to provide services”).
9. See CATHERINE BARNARD, THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION:
THE FOUR FREEDOMS 390 (2013) (recognizing regulation in the gambling sector to be a
“sensitive socio-cultural issue” where Member States are granted a wide margin of
discretion); see also supra notes 61–73 and accompanying text (regarding the difficulties
in implementing legislation in the gambling market sector); Alain-Laurent Verbeke,
Gambling Regulation in Europe: Moving Beyond Ambiguity and Hypocrisy, in IN THE SHADOW
OF LUXEMBOURG 258 (Alan Littler et al. eds., 2011) (concluding that political sensitivity
“obviously is the reason” why gambling regulation has not been implemented at the
EU-level).
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the compatibility of national regulations of online gambling
with the Treaty of Lisbon. By thoroughly examining each
national legislature’s objectives and the discriminatory effects of
the restrictions they adopt, the CJEU can help ensure that
national restrictions on the gambling sector systematically
pursue legitimate national policy objectives which are consistent
with the objectives of the European Union.
In Part I, this Note briefly summarizes the state of the
European gambling market in the context of the Internal
Market, the lack of EU-wide regulation, and the messy
compatibility law the CJEU has been left to create on its own.
Then, in Part II, this Note compares the two conflicting
frameworks the CJEU has developed over the past two decades
for analyzing the compatibility of a Member State’s territorybased and online gambling regulation with the fundamental
freedoms of the Treaty of Lisbon. In Part III, this Note argues
that the CJEU should return to the more stringent compatibility
analysis laid down in two of its leading precedents, Criminal
proceedings against Piergiorgio Gambelli and Placanica and Others,
because this more demanding analysis of consistency and
proportionality in gambling regulation strikes an appropriate
balance between the ideals of the Treaty of Lisbon and the
interests of national sovereignty.10
I. THE EUROPEAN GAMBLING SECTOR AND THE INTERNAL
MARKET
Part I provides the background for exploring current
gambling regulation in the European Union and the conflicts
the European Union faces. First, Part I.A briefly outlines the
gambling market in the European Union today. Second, Part I.B
discusses the fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Treaties of
the European Union and identifies the social policy objectives
that justify national restrictions on the gambling market. Part I.C
explains the principle of mutual recognition and how it is
employed as a gap-filler where there is no EU-wide
harmonization in an economic sector. Part I.D outlines
10. See Criminal Proceedings against Piergiorgio Gambelli (Gambelli), Case C243/01, [2003] E.C.R. I-13031; see also Placanica and Others (Placanica), Joined Cases
338, 359 & 360/04, [2007] E.C.R. I-1891.
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measures the EU legislative institutions have taken and goals
they have set relating to online gambling regulation. Finally,
Part I.E discusses the preliminary rulings laid down by the CJEU
analyzing gambling regulation over the past two decades.
A. The European Gambling Market and National Regulation
Online gambling, by its nature, is just as accessible across
national frontiers as within them; this has made it difficult for
Member States to apply preexisting national territory-based
gambling regulation to online gambling.11 As the Commission’s
Green Paper on On-Line Gambling (the “Green Paper”)
observed, most gambling regulations were devised in the context
of territory-based gambling regulations and are not effective in
regulating the Internet.12 The licensed gambling industry in the
European Union generated an estimated EU€84.9 billion in
revenues in 2011, and licensed casinos employ an estimated
55,000 workers.13 With the advent of online gambling sites, such
11. Green Paper, supra note 3, at 3 (concluding that rapid growth of online
gambling has made it difficult for differing regulatory regimes in Member States to coexist).
12. Green Paper, supra note 3, at 3 (noting that the two regulatory frameworks coexisted before online gambling because of the limited possibility of providing crossborder gambling services, and the current “challenges posed by the co-existence of
differing regulatory models is illustrated by the number of preliminary rulings in this
area”); see also Anthony Dawes & Kai Struckmann, Rien ne va plus? Mutual Recognition
and the Free Movement of Services in the Gambling Sector after the Santa Casa Judgment, 35
EUR. L. REV. 236, 261 (2010) (highlighting a number of preliminary rulings underway
and the legal uncertainty surrounding online gambling regulation and further
declaring there are “few fields where the application of the fundamental freedoms is as
disputed as online gambling”).
13. See Gambling, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, (Jan. 30, 2014), http://ec.europa.eu/
internal_market/gambling/index_en.htm (estimating the overall gambling market
produces revenues of approximately EU€84.9 billion in 2011 and grows at three
percent per year); see also Revenues and Employees 2012, EUR. CASINO ASSOC., (2012),
http://www.europeancasinoassociation.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Facts_and_figures
/Europe_ECA_revenues_2012_final_public_data.pdf (estimating the total number of
European licensed casino employees in 2012 to be 55,916—this figure excludes other
sectors of gambling and unlicensed operations). In a study commissioned by the
European Commission, the Swiss Institute of Comparative Law found that the EU
gambling market generated Gross Gaming Revenues (“GGR”), which represents gross
winnings after payment of prizes, of approximately EU€51.5 billion in 2003. This is
roughly equivalent to the US gaming industry’s generated GGR of EU€60.7 billion
(approximately US$72.8 billion) in 2003. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, STUDY OF GAMBLING
SERVICES IN THE INTERNAL MARKET OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 1102 (June 14, 2006); see
also Opinion of Advocate General Bot, Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional and
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as Bwin, Stanleybet, and Happybet, the online gambling industry
is the most rapidly growing segment of the market, with a
growth rate of almost fifteen percent annually and projected
annual revenues to be EU€13 billion in 2015.14
Online gambling presents new and serious social risks. An
estimated 6.8 million European gamblers enjoy games of chance
without leaving their homes, and online financial transactions
can easily be carried out electronically.15 Online, the player is
isolated and anonymous; it is difficult for operators to verify the
gambler’s identity, and minors can circumvent prohibitive
procedures.16 An unscrupulous operator can open up a website
and shut it down within minutes of defrauding consumers.17

Bwin International Ltd. v. Departamento de Jogos da Santa Casa da Misericórdia de
Lisboa (Santa Casa), Case C-42/07, [2009] E.C.R. I-7633, ¶ 27 (stating that the gaming
industry is considerable, generates a large income, and provides a substantial number
of jobs). In a later study in 2008, the EU gambling market was estimated to generate
GGR in excess of EU€75.9 billion that year. See Green Paper, supra note 3, at 8.
14. See Gambling, supra note 13 (considering online gambling to be the fastest
growing sector at about 15% per year with revenues expected around EU€13 billion in
2015); see also Green Paper, supra note 3, at 13 (defining “online gaming” as provision
via the internet of sports betting services, casino games, media games, gambling
services operated by and for the benefit of recognized charities and non-profit
organizations, spread betting, promotional games, and lottery services).
15. See Gambling, supra note 13 (estimating 6.8 million consumers participate in
the online gambling market); see also Opinion of Advocate General Bot, Santa Casa,
[2009] E.C.R. I-7633, ¶ 43 (concluding that gambling via the Internet is becoming
increasingly available to more consumers, progressively easier to use each year, and that
financial transactions can easily be carried out through electronic means); SALLY
GAINSBURY, INTERNET GAMBLING: CURRENT RESEARCH FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS 3–4
(2012) (highlighting that fast and cheap broadband access provides easier, 24/7 access
from any location to a variety of online gambling activities).
16. See Opinion of Advocate General Bot, Santa Casa, [2009] E.C.R. I-7633, ¶ 270
(emphasizing that “Internet relationships are anonymous” and security measures can
be easily circumvented online); see also Gainsbury supra note 15, at 4 (distinguishing the
continuous and solitary quality of online gambling from traditional gambling).
17. The United States recently argued to the World Trade Organization (“WTO”)
that online gaming facilitates money laundering. Appellate Body Report—United
States—Measures Affecting the Cross-border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services,
WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005). In view of the risks that online gambling poses to the
consumer and the public order, the Appellate Body of the WTO found that regulations
imposed by the United States on online gaming “were necessary for the protection of
public morality and the maintenance of public order.” Opinion of Advocate General
Bot, Santa Casa, [2009] E.C.R. I-7633, ¶ 274, n.113 (quoting A.B. Report—United States—
Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 327, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005)); see also
Gainsbury, supra note 15, at 77–78 (discussing examples of gambling sites defrauding
consumers, such as Absolute Poker and Ultimate Bet employees that bilked consumers
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Online gambling presents heightened risks of addiction with
twenty-four hour access to a multitude of games and lines of
credit at the touch of a button.18 The casino never closes on your
laptop.
On the one hand, online gambling creates high risks to
consumers and society at large; on the other hand, Member
States often obtain a significant source of revenue from taxes on
gambling activity.19 Gambling addiction can lead to debt and
despair, which in one instance induced an Italian policeman to
kidnap his neighbor’s son for ransom and, in another, led a
young man to self-immolate. 20 Moreover, organized crime
groups use legal gambling operations to launder billions of
euros with little chance of detection.21 The European Union, to
date, has not taken significant steps to regulate online gambling
at the EU level due to these politically sensitive social risks
associated with the activity and the revenue opportunities for
Member States.22
out of over US$23 million through accessing private accounts and citing identity theft,
bankruptcy, and scam emails as potential risks associated with online gambling).
18. See, e.g., François Trucy, The Role of Crime and Addiction in the Gambling Policy of
France, in CRIME, ADDICTION AND THE REGULATION OF GAMBLING, supra note 2, at 139
(commenting that the French system of regulation is ill-equipped to face new issues
posed by online gambling and recognizing the gravity of gambling addiction); see also
SÉNAT, LA LUTTE CONTRE LA DÉPENDENCE AUX JEUX (Sept. 2007), http://www.senat.fr/
lc/lc175/lc175_mono.html#toc0 (surveying legal measures Germany, Belgium,
Denmark, Great Britain, Italy, and the Netherlands have taken to fight gambling
addiction); GAINSBURY, supra note 15, at 3 (reporting that there are an estimated 199
payment methods available for online gambling, which make payment or withdrawal of
money through multiple channels or through channels that circumvent regulation
possible).
19. See CRIME, ADDICTION AND THE REGULATION OF GAMBLING, supra note 2, at 1
(acknowledging gambling is regulated in order to both channel the activity and to
direct profits towards the general interest); see also Caroline Jawad & Stephen Griffiths,
Preventing Problem Gambling on the Internet Through the Use of Social Responsibility
Mechanisms, in CRIME, ADDICTION AND THE REGULATION OF GAMBLING, supra note 2, at
204 (stating that policy makers must balance potential material benefits of gambling
with the need to curb the activity).
20. See Tom Kingston, State and Mafia Take Their Cut As Italians Develop Gambling
Habit, GUARDIAN, Feb. 29, 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/feb/29/
state-mafia-italy-gambling (recounting how a policeman kidnapped his neighbor’s son
for EU€85,000 because he had “lost everything at video poker” and the story of how a
young Italian man self-immolated due to gambling debt).
21. See Scherer, supra note 5 (claiming that the mafia clans in Italy are the biggest
winners in gambling because they use the legal operations to launder billions of euros).
22. See BARNARD, supra note 9, at 390 (finding gambling regulation to be a
“sensitive socio-cultural issue” where Member States are granted a significant amount

2014]

A BUSTED FLUSH

1533

The European Union has enacted rules regulating
electronic commerce, but these do not fully apply to online
gambling, and Member States retain the principal regulatory
role in this sector.23 The lack of a coherent EU-wide policy on
online gambling and the lack of enforcement of the variety of
existing national rules across the Member States have created
legal uncertainty that operators exploit.24 Out of 14,823 active
Internet gambling sites operating in the European Union in
2006, the Green Paper indicated that more than eighty-five
percent of such sites operated without a license in an undefined
or illegal market.25 Moreover, the problems Member States have
faced in enforcing regulation in the online gambling sector are
readily apparent in the unusually large number of preliminary
rulings the CJEU has been asked to make in this area.26

of discretion); see also GAINSBURY, supra note 15, at 50–52 (citing one of the biggest
challenges in Europe to be heterogeneous regulation in each Member State, and that
this inconsistency causes problems for regulators, operators, and consumers alike).
Gambling services are neither regulated by any sector-specific regulation at the EU
level, nor included in the Services Directive (2006/123/EC) or the E-commerce
Directive (2000/31/EC). They are, however, subject to the Audiovisual Media Services
Directive (2010 O.J. L 95/1), the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (2005 O.J. L
149/22), the Distance Selling Directive (1997 O.J. L 144/p. 19), the Anti-Money
Laundering Directive (2005 O.J. L 309/15), the Data Protection Directive (1995 O.J. L
281/31), the Directive on privacy and electronic communication (2002 O.J. L 201/37),
and the Directive on the common system of value added tax (2006 O.J. L 347/1).
Green Paper, supra note 3, at 7, 12 (clarifying that gambling services are not regulated
at the EU level and are specifically excluded from certain legislation like the Ecommerce Directive and then listing legislation gambling is subject to).
23. See infra notes 63–73 and accompanying text (discussing regulations governing
electronic commerce in the European Union and the Member States’ role in
regulating online gambling).
24. See Dawes & Struckmann, supra note 12, at 261 (“In these evolving legal
circumstances, economic operators and their consumers (as well as regulators
themselves) face considerable legal uncertainty . . . .”); see also GAINSBURY, supra note
15, at 4 (observing that the regulatory position of online gambling is not clear, which
creates legal uncertainty for consumers and operators alike).
25. Green Paper, supra note 3, at 3 (“[O]ut of 14,823 active gambling sites in
Europe more than 85% operated without any licence.” (citing Laboratoire d’Expertise
Securite Informatique, Cyber-Criminality in Online Gambling: White Paper by CERTLEXSI, July 2006, available at http://www.lexsi.com/telecharger/gambling_cybercrime
_2006.pdf)).
26. See STUDY OF GAMBLING SERVICES IN THE INTERNAL MARKET OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION, supra note 13, at 4-964 (cataloging 587 cases brought before national Courts,
mostly in Germany, regarding restrictions on cross-border gambling services as of the
year 2006).
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B. The Gambling Regulation Exception to the Fundamental Freedoms
of the European Union
Currently, as noted above, the European Parliament and
the Council have not adopted any measures directed at
governing online gambling, and there is no EU-wide
harmonization in the gambling sector. The Member States have,
over the centuries, developed their own schemes of gambling
regulations that reflect wide variations both in application and
social objectives.27 Broadly, two major systems have developed
across the European Union to regulate gaming. A number of
states have employed a state monopoly or partial monopoly on
gambling with success, while others have adopted a licensing
system often coupled with a quota limit on the number of
licenses the Member State will grant.28 Both systems, however,
have been found to restrict the freedom of services. 29 The
European Union, the CJEU, and the Member States have faced
major challenges in making these disparate regulations
compatible with the fundamental freedoms enshrined in the
Treaty of Lisbon.30
27. See CRIME, ADDICTION AND THE REGULATION OF GAMBLING, supra note 2, at 1
(explaining that governments have regulated gambling for centuries); see also Green
Paper, supra note 3, at 3 (outlining differing regulatory models applied in Member
States); STUDY OF GAMBLING SERVICES IN THE INTERNAL MARKET OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION, supra note 14, at xiv–xvi (finding that, generally, if a Member State regulates
gambling, it either applies a controlled monopoly scheme with the gaming operator
being owned or controlled by the Member State or a strictly regulated licensing
system).
28 . See, e.g., Ladbrokes Betting & Gaming Ltd. v. Stichting de Nationale
Sporttolisator (Ladbrokes), Case C-258/08, [2010] 3 C.M.L.R. 40, ¶ 16 (discussing the
grant of exclusive monopoly rights to an operator); Massimiliano Placanica, Christian
Palazzese, Angelo Sorrichio (Placanica), Joined Cases C-338/04, C-359/04, and C360/04, [2007] E.C.R. I-1891, ¶¶ 3–10 (outlining the licensing scheme employed in
Italy whereby the government grants a limited number of licenses to operators).
29. See, e.g., Gambelli, [2003] E.C.R. I-13031, ¶ 106 (finding the licensing system in
Italy to be an obstacle to the free provision of services); Liga Portuguesa de Futebol
Profissional and Bwin International Ltd. v. Departamento de Jogos da Santa Casa da
Misericórdia de Lisboa (Santa Casa), Case C-42/07, [2009] E.C.R. I-7633, ¶¶ 52–54
(concluding that the Portuguese public monopoly system is a restriction on the
freedom to provide services).
30. See Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi, Carmen Media Group Ltd. v.
Land Schleswig-Holstein, Innenminister des Landes Schleswig-Holstein, March 3, 2010,
¶ 1 (asserting that the CJEU’s major challenge in a non-harmonized sector like
gambling regulation is to “find common ground allowing the observance of the
freedoms enshrined in the Treaty”).
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At their core, the Articles that create the Internal Market
are intended to open up markets in order to increase
competition and progress, which benefits customers and the
economy as a whole.31 Free trade allows for specialization and
greater competition, which, through economies of scale, ideally
lead to greater productivity.32 Furthermore, the Treaty of Lisbon
is designed to prevent national markets from becoming
“fiefdoms of the providers established there.”33 Markets must be
kept open for the benefit of all and cannot be allowed to
“crystallise” or calcify. 34 By preventing this calcification,
increased trade and mutual dependency promote peace in
Europe.35
The CJEU has issued a number of preliminary rulings on
the compatibility of Member States’ restrictions on gambling
with the Treaty of Lisbon.36 In many of these rulings, the CJEU
31. See TFEU, supra note 2, art. 26 (ex art. 14 TEC), 2012 O.J. C 326, at 59
(defining the internal market as comprising “an area without internal frontiers in
which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in
accordance with the provisions of the Treaties”); see also ALAN DASHWOOD ET AL,
WYATT AND DASHWOOD’S EUROPEAN UNION LAW 391 (6th ed. 2011) (“One of the main
aims of the European integration project is that of market integration.”); Stefan
Enchelmaier, Always At Your Service (Within Limits): The ECJ’s Case Law on Article 56
TFEU (2006–11), 36 EUR. L. REV. 615, 639 (2012) (“Above all . . . Member States must
not discriminate against goods or services from other Member States.”).
32. BARNARD, supra note 9, at 3–4 (arguing that free trade leads to specialization
and comparative advantage, this then allows for economies of scale and maximum
productivity for all (citing ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776))).
33. Enchelmaier, supra note 31, at 639 (welcoming the CJEU’s rejection of
Member States’ economic protectionism because “national markets are not the
fiefdoms of the providers established there”).
34. Id. at 618 (citing language from Commission v. United Kingdom (beer and wine),
Case C-170/78, [1983] E.C.R. I-2265, on the prohibition of protectionist taxation
forbidden by TFEU art. 110 (ex art. 90 EC/95 EEC)).
35. BARNARD, supra note 9, at 6, 28 (“The driving force behind the European
Union is, and has always been, the consolidation of a post-war system of inter-state
cooperation and integration that would make pan-European armed conflict
inconceivable” and further arguing that increasing prosperity in two interdependent
trading countries and trade also facilitate peace because “countries trading peacefully
are less likely to go to war”).
36. See TFEU, supra note 2, art. 267 (ex art. 234 TEC), 2012 O.J. C 326, at 164
(granting the CJEU the power to issue preliminary rulings regarding the interpretation
of the Treaties and the validity of EU acts in reply to questions raised by national courts
or tribunals); see also The Proceedings of the Court of Justice and Court of First Instance of the
European Communities, No. 15/95, ¶ 11 (May 22–26, 1995) (stating that the preliminary
ruling system is the “veritable cornerstone of the . . . internal market, since it . . .
ensur[es] that the law established by the Treaties retain its Community character with a

1536 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:1525
has found restrictions on the free market to be justified in light
of certain policy objectives beyond the Treaty-based
exceptions.37 Attempts to regulate online gambling potentially
restrict two crucial fundamental freedoms: the freedom of
establishment and the freedom to provide services. 38 The
fundamental freedoms provide equal rights of access to the
market to all, but they do not preclude appropriate regulation
of the gambling market within each Member States’ borders.39
The Treaty allows regulation that discriminates on the basis of
nationality when it is tailored to achieve a “public policy, public
security or public health” objective.40
Furthermore, the CJEU has created exceptions to the
freedoms in the name of overriding public interest, which
national legislatures often cite in justifying gambling
view to guaranteeing that the law has the same effect in all circumstances in all the
Member States of the European Union”); ARNULL, supra note 2, at 97 (“It is hard to
exaggerate the importance of the preliminary rulings procedure.”). The rulings are
interlocutory and the referring national court is bound by the CJEU’s judgment. See id.
at 95 (“The ruling given by the Court is an interlocutory one: it constitutes a step in the
proceedings before the national court which, although bound by it, must proceed to
apply it to the facts of the case. It is in this sense that the ruling of the Court of Justice is
preliminary.”); see also DASHWOOD, supra note 31, at 228 (stating that the referring
court must give full effect to the CJEU’s ruling even if it conflicts with provisions of
national law).
37. See TFEU, supra note 2, art. 52 (ex art. 46 TEC), 2012 O.J. C 326, at 69
(allowing regulation that may restrict the freedom of establishment or free provision of
services “on grounds of public policy, public security or public health”); see also
BARNARD, supra note 9, at 497 (stating that the public interest requirements
supplement the express derogations of article 52).
38. TFEU, supra note 2, arts. 18, 49, 56 (ex arts. 12, 43, 49 TEC), 2012 O.J. C 326,
at 56, 67, 70 (prohibiting restrictions on the freedom of primary and secondary
establishment, prohibiting restrictions on the freedom to provide services, and
enshrining the principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality further);
DASHWOOD, supra note 31, at 31 (observing that the principle of non-discrimination on
the basis of nationality has played a central role in the development of EU law in many
fields beyond services).
39. Enchelmaier, supra note 31, at 639–40 (asserting that the Internal Market
means equal rights of access for all but allows the possibility of regulation by each
Member State).
40. See TFEU, supra note 3, art. 52 (ex art. 46 TEC), 2012 O.J. C 326, at 69; see also
BARNARD, supra note 9, at 17 (declaring the principle of non-discrimination to be the
cornerstone of the four freedoms); see also Jochen Meulman & Henri de Waele, A
Retreat from Säger? Servicing or Fine-Tuning the Application of Article 49, 33 LEGAL ISSUES
ECON. INTEGRATION 207, 210 (2006) (outlining the theoretical underpinnings of the
free provision of services and concluding that striving for non-discrimination and
market access will better help to integrate national markets).
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regulations. In the 1974 leading precedent, J.H.M. van
Binsbergen v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de
Metaalnijverheid, the CJEU held that Member States could
restrict and regulate cross-border services to protect the
“general good” or public interest.41 Van Binsbergen determined
that certain overriding policy objectives, like maintaining
standards of conduct in the legal profession, could justify a
restriction on provision of services. Later rulings have reaffirmed
this holding and given the compatibility analysis more teeth in
protecting market access. 42 Thus, overriding policy objectives
may justify a gambling regulation if grounded in moral,
religious, or cultural factors, or if the legislature shows that
gambling has harmful consequences.43
The two major types of policy justifications that the CJEU
has found sufficient to allow restriction in the gambling sector
are consumer protection and crime prevention.44 The CJEU,
41 . J.H.M. van Binsbergen v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de
Metaalnijverheid (Van Binsbergen), Case C-33/74, [1974] E.C.R. 1299, ¶ 12 (“[S]pecific
requirements imposed on the person providing the service cannot be considered
incompatible with the Treaty where they have as their purpose the application of
profession rules justified by the general good . . . .”); see also Stichting Collectieve
Antennevoorziening Gouda v. Commissariaat voor de Media (Gouda), Case 2-88/89,
[1991] E.C.R. I-4007, ¶ 10 (“Article [56 TFEU] entails, in the first place, the abolition
of any discrimination against a person providing services on the grounds of his
nationality or the fact that he is established in a Member State other than the one in
which the service is provided.”). In Van Binsbergen, a Dutch national who lived in
Belgium challenged a rule that required lawyers to be established in the Netherlands
before they could represent a client in Dutch courts. Van Binsbergen, [1974] E.C.R.
1299, at 1301–02.
42. See Gebhard v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano
(Gebhard), Case C-55/94, [1995] E.C.R. I-4165, ¶ 37 (“[N]ational measures liable to
hinder or make less attractive the exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the
Treaty must fulfill four conditions: they must be applied in a non-discriminatory
manner; they must be justified by imperative requirements in the general interest; they
must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue; and
they must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it.”); see also BARNARD,
supra note 9, at 19 (arguing that the CJEU since Gebhard favors the market access
approach, which finds unlawful Member State regulation that prevents or hinders
access to the market, regardless of whether the regulation discriminates on the basis of
nationality).
43. Gambelli, [2003] E.C.R. I-13031, ¶ 63 (finding that moral, religious, and
cultural factors can justify granting a margin of discretion to national authorities in
regulation of gambling activities and determining “what consumer protection and the
preservation of public order require”).
44. See Dawes & Struckmann, supra note 12, at 239 (dividing the acceptable policy
justifications into two main categories: “social” objectives such as consumer protection
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however, is seen by some scholars to give greater deference to
the national legislatures when they are regulating against
crime.45 Social objectives are increasingly used to justify national
gambling regulations, but the CJEU has consistently rejected
Member State objectives of economic protectionism, the
stabilization of tax revenue, and administrative convenience.46
Moreover, the CJEU insists in its rulings on the consistency
and proportionality of the means to the targeted policy
objectives. Indeed, the CJEU stated in Gambelli that where a
Member State pursues a policy of expanding gambling
operations and aggressively advertising for its own state-run
gambling enterprise, the policy and advertisements could be
found inconsistent with the legislative objective of protecting

and crime reduction objectives). But see Verbeke, supra note 9, at 257 (questioning why
consumer protection against addiction is regulated at the national level—“[a]re the
risks for a Belgian player so different form those for someone in Germany, France, or
Greece?”).
45. See Dawes & Struckmann, supra note 12, at 240, 244 (stating that there is little
evidence given of fraud online or studies produced on this issue, and that the CJEU has
granted too much deference and discretion to the national legislatures here, and also
arguing that the CJEU has adopted a more stringent approach in relation to social
objectives in contrast to objectives aimed at reducing criminal activity); Verbeke, supra
note 9, at 258 (declaring that “criminality is an international business” and arguing
that it should be attacked at the EU-level). But see Joined Opinion of Advocate General
Bot for Sporting Exchange Ltd. (t/a Betfair) v. Minister van Justitie and Ladbrokes Ltd.
v. Stichting de Nationale Sporttolisator, ¶ 92 (“I do not think that the defence of the
fundamental freedoms of movement justifies expecting the Member States to wait until
actual networks of clandestine gaming develop . . . . A Member State has the right to
invoke the risk of fraud associated with gaming as the basis for legislation restricting
that activity, without being required to show that fraud is actually being committed in
its territory.”); Dawes & Struckmann, supra note 12, at 240 (“A national measure aimed
at reducing criminal activity relating to gambling may therefore be necessary and
proportionate, even where its net result is to incite and encourage consumers to
participate in games of chance.”).
46. See Enchelmaier, supra note 31, at 639 (discussing examples of the CJEU
rejecting these types of objectives in the gambling regulation case law: The Italian
government’s proposed economic protectionism objective in limiting horse-race
betting failed in Commission v. Italy and the French government’s pursuit of stable tax
revenue used to invest in rural projects failed to justify regulations in Zeturf); see also
Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, Placanica, ¶ 108 (stating that the CJEU
has rejected the diminution or tax revenue or loss of financing as an overriding policy
justification in past judgments such as Gambelli); Zeturf Ltd. v. Premier Ministre
(Zeturf), Case C-212/08, [2011] 3 C.M.L.R. 30, ¶ 48 (“[A]dministrative inconvenience
does not constitute a ground that can justify a restriction on a fundamental freedom
guaranteed by [EU] law.”).
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consumers from the vice of gambling.47 In order to control and
prevent fraud in gambling activities, however, the Member State
needs its regulated gambling system to be the preferred system
for prospective gamblers; this requires advertising, a range of
games of chance, and top-of-the-line facilities.48 As the CJEU
pointed out in Gambelli, however, the goal of consumer
protection is ultimately undermined by the marketing and
expansion of state-owned or controlled gambling systems that
induces consumers to use the gambling product.49 Consumers
are not protected against the risks of gambling where the
Member State is hypocritically encouraging the consumers to
gamble.
C. Lack of Harmonization and the Principle of Mutual Recognition of
Regulation
There is currently no harmonization in the field of
gambling regulation though the EU legislature has the power to
adopt directives to harmonize differing rules in each Member
State into one uniform EU-wide rule that advances the internal

47 . See Gambelli, [2003] E.C.R. I-13031, ¶¶ 68–69 (stating that the Italian
authorities were pursuing an expansionist policy in gambling and could not justify such
legislation in the name of consumer protection and reducing gambling opportunities
in Italy); see also Opinion of Advocate General Alber, Gambelli, [2003] E.C.R. I-13031, ¶ 127
(declaring “it is clear from the submissions of the Member States that what they fear
most is the economic consequences of changes within the gambling sector. Little
reference is made in this context to any dangerous effects that gambling might have on
gamblers and their social environment. Consequently, such fears likewise cannot be
regarded as an interest in the protection of consumers that would constitute an
overriding reason in the general interest.”). But see Ladbrokes, [2010] 3 C.M.L.R. 40, ¶
38 (holding that it is for the national court “to determine whether unlawful gaming
activities constitute a problem which might be solved by the expansion of authorised
and regulated activities, and whether that expansion is on such a scale as to make it
impossible to reconcile with the objective of curbing such addiction”).
48. See Ladbrokes, [2010] 3 C.M.L.R. 40, ¶ 25 (concluding that in order to channel
gambling activity, Member States need to be a “reliable” and “attractive” alternative to
clandestine gambling operations); see also infra notes 165–73 and accompanying text
(summarizing the CJEU’s opinion in Ladbrokes and Betfair).
49. See Opinion of Advocate General Alber, Gambelli, [2003] E.C.R. I-13031, ¶¶ 121,
127–29 (observing that the Italian authorities pursue “aggressive” advertising
“intended to instill and foster a desire to gamble” and it is clear that Italy most fears a
loss of revenue, and that these economic objectives cannot justify a restriction on the
free provision of services).
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market.50 Harmonization of disparate Member State regulations
can vary in degree; a common form called minimum
harmonization sets the floor for national regulation, while
comprehensive harmonization leaves little room for national
differences.51 Since the landmark judgment of Rewe-Zentral AG v.
Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (“Cassis de Dijon”), the
Commission and the CJEU have applied the principle of mutual
recognition in the free movement of goods as a gap-filler in the
absence of harmonization.52
Mutual recognition is considered to be a “corner stone” of
the Internal Market because it enables products to move freely
despite differing national regulations. 53 When applied in a
market sector, mutual recognition provides that goods in
conformity with one Member State’s regulations are also in
conformity with another Member State’s regulations, despite
discrepancies, and, thus, creates a presumption in favor of
50 . See BARNARD, supra note 9, at 656 (summarizing harmonization as the
replacing of many divergent Member State regulations in a specific field with a single
EU-wide regulation).
51. Id. at 662 (establishing that minimum harmonization sets standards for the
Member States, but the Member States are still free to legislate further, an especially
attractive option in areas of regulation that implicate social and moral policy). States
are free to experiment above the minimum standard, but they usually have to inform
the Commission about the acts they have implemented. This creates a useful database
for the Commission about successful policy initiatives that can then be implemented
EU-wide. Id. at 662, 665–66. One example of success in using the Member States as
policy labs is in the environmental field: Austria, Finland, and Sweden successfully
applied stricter environmental standards than required by the directive, which led to
the adoption of higher EU-wide standards in a number of areas. Id. at 666 n. 258
(discussing COM (98) 745).
52. Cassis de Dijon, Case 120/78, [1979] E.C.R. 649 (decided on free movement of
goods grounds). This case involved the banning of importation into Germany of fruit
liqueurs due to insufficient alcohol content. The CJEU found that absent
harmonization, there is no reason why lawfully produced and marketed goods cannot
be sold in another Member State. Id. ¶ 13. Shortly after this ruling, the Commission
issued an interpretative communication, which recognizes the principle of equivalence
or mutual recognition. BARNARD, supra note 9, at 95; see European Commission,
Communication from the Commission Regarding the Cassis de Dijon Judgment, 1980
OJ C256/2. In 2007, the Commission revitalized this principle of mutual recognition
through regulation. European Commission, Package on the Internal Market for Goods,
COM (2007) 35.
53. See Commission, Communication on Internal Market Strategy, Priorities 2003–
2006, COM (2003) 238 final, at 7 (May 2003) (basing the presumption that products in
conformity with the national laws of the Member State allow the product marketed to
move freely in that Member State on the Cassis judgment, and declaring “[m]utual
recognition is the corner stone of the Internal Market”).
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market access. 54 The principle of mutual recognition is also
applied with regard to services and establishment.55
In 2009 in Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional and Bwin
International Ltd v. Departamento de Jogos da Santa Casa da
Misericórdia de Lisboa, the CJEU rejected the application of
mutual recognition in the gambling sector.56 The CJEU followed
the Opinion of AG Yves Bot who found that encouraging
competition in gambling is not “a source of progress and
development” in the same way as, for example, the freedom of
movement of patients within the European Union increased the
rang of medical treatment available.57 AGs Dámaso Ruiz-Jarabo
Colomer and Siegbert Alber, however, argue that mutual
54. See BARNARD, supra note 9, at 95 (explaining that goods produced in one
Member State would have market access in all other Member States and citing the
Commission’s response to Cassis); see also Commission, Communication from the
Commission regarding the Cassis de Dijon judgment, 1980 O.J. C 256/2 (recognizing
the Cassis decision and the application of the principle of mutual recognition; Opinion
of Advocate General Mengozzi, Carmen Media, [2010] E.C.R. I-8149, ¶ 33 (categorizing
mutual recognition as a tool aimed at guaranteeing market access across the European
Union even in sectors with significant discrepancies in regulation, and stressing the
importance of balance so that the Member State where the service is provided is not
duplicating controls of the provider Member State).
55. See Dawes & Struckmann, supra note 12, at 259 (“The concept of mutual
recognition was developed by the [CJEU] as a way to facilitate market access for goods
. . . [and] was later extended by the Court to other freedoms so as to ensure the
achievement of the objectives of the common market in the absence of harmonization
. . . .” (citing Säger v. Dennemeyer & Co. Ltd., Case C-76/90 [1991] E.C.R. I-4221)).
56. See Santa Casa, [2009] E.C.R. I-7633, ¶ 69 (holding that a Member State is
entitled to regard regulations in other Member States as insufficient assurance that
national consumers will be protected against crime and the other risks of gambling); see
also Dickinger & Ömer, Case C-347/09, [2011] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 96 (delivered Sept. 15,
2011) (not yet reported) (re-establishing that there is no duty of mutual recognition in
this field); Georgios Anagnostaras, Les Jeux Sont Faits? Mutual Recognition and the
Specificities of Online Gambling, 37 EUR. L. REV. 191, 192 (2012) (stating that gambling
“escapes completely the application of the mutual recognition principle.”).
57. Opinion of Advocate General Bot, Santa Casa, [2009] E.C.R. I-7633, ¶¶ 245–
47 (failing to see how increasing competition in the gambling market would lead to
progress and development of the EU community and finding comparison between
increased competition in gambling inapposite to increased competition in medical
treatment); see Joined Opinion Advocate General Bot, Ladbrokes and Betfair, [2010] 3
C.M.L.R. 40, ¶¶ 15, 119–24 (concluding that the principle of mutual recognition
should not apply to the gambling market and that a Member State is entitled to find
another State’s gambling regulations insufficient protection against fraud and crime).
But see Dawes & Struckmann, supra note 12, at 252 (arguing that this “gives the
Member States carte blanche to impose unjustified restrictions on the provision of online
gambling services by all EU-licences online gambling operators, regardless of the
integrity of such operators”).
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recognition should be applied to the gambling sector as it has
been applied to other politically sensitive areas like criminal
law.58 As there is such great diversity in national regulation of
gambling, mutual recognition may be hard for legislators and
operators to apply because it would be difficult to recognize the
validity of a public monopoly grant in a licensing system
Member State or vice versa.59 Some scholars believe this makes
the case for harmonization more compelling.60
D. Actions Taken by the European Union Legislature
The intricate EU “ordinary legislative” process makes
adopting EU-wide regulation difficult. The “ordinary legislative
procedure” in the European Union involves multiple steps,
initiated by the Commission and ending in enactment only if

58. See, e.g., Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, Placanica, [2007]
E.C.R. I-1894, ¶ 130 (concluding that he shares AG Alber’s opinion that if an operator
from one Member State meets the regulatory requirements applicable in another State,
that should provide “sufficient guarantee of the integrity of the operator”); see also
Opinion of Advocate General Alber, Gambelli, [2003] E.C.R. I-13031, ¶ 118 (discussing
that gambling is regulated in all Member States on largely the same grounds, and
concluding thus, if an operator is licensed in one Member State, that should be a
sufficient guarantee of the operator’s integrity.); Anagnostaras, supra note 56, at 194–
95 (arguing that the “it is precisely in the absence of legislative approximation that this
principle comes into play” and commenting that mutual recognition has been applied
successfully in criminal law (citing Cassis de Dijon, Case C-120/78, [1979] E.C.R. 649,
¶ 8; Arblade, Case C-376/96, [1999] E.C.R. I-8453)); Council Framework Decision
2002/584/JHA. O.J. L190/1 (June 13, 2002) (outlining the EU arrest warrant and
surrender procedures between Member States); TFEU, supra note 3, art. 67(3) (ex art.
61 TEC and ex art. 29 TEU), 2008 O.J. C 115/47, at 97 (recognizing the application of
mutual recognition of judgments in criminal matters).
59. Enchelmaier, supra note 31, at 624 (discussing the intricacies of applying
mutual recognition and the fact that the principle mainly rests on an analysis of
whether the aims of legislation in the Member State where the service is provided are
being achieved by regulations in place in the Member State where the operator is
based).
60. Dimitrios Doukas, In a Bet There Is a Fool and a State Monopoly: Are the Odds
Stacked Against Cross-Border Gambling?, 36 EUR. L. REV. 242, 263 (2012) (“The
inadequacy of the Court’s approach and the adverse impact of the divergences in
national laws on the establishment and functioning of the internal market for gambling
and associated services make the need for EU harmonization compelling.”); see also
Dimitrios Doukas & Jack Anderson, Commercial Gambling Without Frontiers: When the ECJ
Throws, the Dice is Loaded, 27 Y.B. EURO. L. 257 (2008) (describing the piecemeal
approach to gambling regulation in the current absence of minimum harmonization as
“ultimately self-defeating”).
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the European Parliament and Council reach an agreement.61
This process of joint action on legislation makes regulating
politically sensitive issues like gambling even more complicated
and the possibility of EU-wide harmonization seem unlikely at
this time.62
Although gambling regulation is somewhat difficult to
implement due to the complexities of the EU legislative process
and the policy concerns of Member States, gambling regulation
has consistently been on the institution’s agenda. The
Commission first suggested that regulation of gambling should
be subject to the single market regime in 1991, but did not press
the issue due to some Member States’ reluctance.63 Although the
European Parliament and Council adopted the E-commerce
Directive in 2000, gambling and games of chance were expressly
excluded from that Directive’s coverage. 64 The issues of
gambling regulation were highlighted in the Presidency of the
Council progress reports in both 2008 and 2009, and Parliament
in 2009 called on Member States to cooperate on solving
61. See DASHWOOD, supra note 31, at 73 (finding this “dual democratic basis is
best reflected in the Union’s ‘ordinary legislative procedure’—previously known as codecision—since it is based on an equal say between the European Parliament and the
Council”); see also TFEU, supra note 2, art. 294 (ex art. 251 TEC), 2012 O.J. C 326, at
173–74 (renaming the co-decision process the “ordinary legislative procedure”). The
Commission has the sole power to initiate a legislative draft. See TEU post-Lisbon, supra
note 4, art. 17(2), 2012 O.J. C 326, at 25 (“Union legislative acts may only be adopted
on the basis of a Commission proposal, except where the Treaties provide otherwise.”);
see also Dashwood, supra note 32, at 72 (stating this rule was developed to ensure
legislative powers would only be initiated by “the Union institution with a duty to act
independently and without regard to any specific national interests.”). Then the
European Parliament and the Council begin the process of co-decision. See Dashwood,
supra note 32, at 74 Figure 4.1 (displaying a graph of the ordinary legislative
procedure); see also Hartley, supra note 3, at 37–38 (describing the legislative process
whereby a Commission proposal is debated and amended by both the European
Parliament and the Council).
62. See Rose M. Lastra, Banking Union and Single Market: Conflict or Companionship?,
36 FORDHAM INT’L. L.J. 1190, 1194–1201 & nn. 7–33 (outlining recent example of the
complex legislative process in the context of creating a banking union).
63. See Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, Placanica, [2007]
E.C.R. I-1894, ¶ 145 (attempting on the Commission’s part to regulate gambling based
of the results in a study); see also Presidency Conclusions, Edinburgh, Dec. 11–12, 1992,
DOC/92/8 (Dec. 13, 1992) (deciding on the Council’s part not to harmonize
gambling regulation).
64. Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on
certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce,
in the Internal Market.
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discrete issues like fraud prevention, age minimums for online
gambling, and minimum requirements for consumer
protection.65
The Commission’s 2011 Green Paper surveyed the current
policy challenges in regulating online gambling and was
designed to launch a dialogue about possible solutions to the
lack of consistency. 66 A year later, the Commission’s
Communication entitled “Towards a comprehensive European
framework for online gambling” set out recommendations on
consumer protection and advertising in gambling. 67 The
Communication also announced the Commission’s decision to
re-launch infringement proceedings against nine Member States
and to investigate legislation in twenty Member States. 68
Proceedings brought by the Commission against Member States
for infringements of Treaty or secondary rules are a vital mode
of enforcing EU law. 69 The Commission soon fulfilled the
promise of the 2012 Communication and reinvigorated the
infringement proceedings against noncompliant Member States
in November 2013. 70 These are the first Commission

65. Progress Report of the French Presidency of the EU, Gambling and Betting:
Legal Framework and Policies in the Member States of the EU, DOC/16022/08 (Nov.
27, 2008); see also Progress Report of the Swedish Presidency of the EU, Legal
Framework for Gambling and Betting in the Member States of the European Union, ,
DOC/16571/09 (Nov. 25, 2009); European Parliament resolution of 10 March 2009 on
the integrity of online gambling, 2008/2215(INI); Dawes & Struckmann, supra note 12,
at 254 (summarizing that the Report and Resolution reject complete harmonization of
online gambling regulation, but both call on Member State cooperation on a number
of issues).
66. See Green Paper, supra note 3, at 3 (highlighting that the goal of the Green
Paper is to launch a public discussion on policy challenges and issues with respect to
the growth of online gambling in the European Union).
67. Communication from the Commission, Towards a Comprehensive European
Framework for Online Gambling, COM (2012) 596 final (Oct. 23, 2012).
68. See id. (re-launching proceedings against Germany, Greece, the Netherlands,
Hungary, Greece, Sweden, and Finland).
69. See TFEU, supra note 2, art. 258 (ex art. 226 TEC), 2012 O.J. C 326, at 160
(creating the Commission’s power to bring infringement proceedings against
noncompliant Member States); see also DASHWOOD, supra note 31, at 135 (finding the
power given to the Commission to enforce and supervise Member State compliance
with their obligations to the Treaties to be distinguished from other supranational
orders).
70. Commission, Commission Requests Member States to Comply with EU law
when Regulating Gambling Services, IP/13/1101 (2013).
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infringement proceedings to remove obstacles to free trade in
gambling regulation since 2008.71
At the same time the Commission re-launched
infringement proceedings, the European Parliament adopted a
resolution on online gambling in September 2013. 72 This
resolution stressed the unique risks online gambling poses to
consumer health, and it recommended that uniform, EU-wide
common online security standards be adopted and
administrative cooperation be increased. 73 Presumably the
Council’s silence on the matter of gambling regulation since the
1992 decision not to harmonize speaks to its reluctance to
initiate legislation in this area. However, the recent legislative
discussion surrounding gambling regulation may lead to
minimum harmonization, or, at the very least, increased
protection of the internal market through infringement
proceedings.
E. Development of a Compatibility Analysis for Gambling Regulations
by the CJEU
The CJEU has largely shouldered the burden of reconciling
the free market principles of EU law and differing national
gambling regulations. Part I.E.1 summarizes the CJEU’s basic
compatibility framework applied to disputes regarding gambling
regulations. Part I.E.2 describes the earliest, highly deferential
preliminary rulings on gambling regulation starting with
Schindler in 1994 that preceded the conflicting case-law discussed
in Part II. Next, Part I.E.3 addresses the three German cases the
Grand Chamber delivered on September 8, 2010 (the “German
Triad”), which followed the cases in Part II and reinvigorated
analysis used in Gambelli. Part I.E.4 considers this continued
trend of the CJEU adhering closely to the ideals of the
fundamental freedoms by demanding support for the
71 . See Commission, Commission Acts to Remove Obstacles to Provision of
Gambling Services in Greece and The Netherlands, IP/08/330 (2013).
72. European Parliament Resolution on Online Gambling in the Internal Market,
2012/2322(INI) (Sept. 10, 2013). The Resolution was adopted 572 votes to 79, with 61
abstentions. Id.
73. Id.; see also Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection,
Report on Online Gambling in the Internal Market 2012/2311 (INI) (Ashley Fox,
Rapporteur).
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legislature’s policy objectives and employing a searching analysis
of the proportionality of gambling regulations with these
objectives. Next, Part I.E.5 explores the potential resurrection of
mutual recognition in the gambling market in the 2012 HIT and
HIT Larix judgment. Finally, Part I.E.6 examines two recent
decisions in which the CJEU implicitly argues for the more
liberalized licensing systems that are more faithful to the Treaty
of Lisbon principles.
1. The Compatibility Framework Applied to Preliminary Rulings
Regarding Gambling Regulations in the CJEU
Over the past two decades, the CJEU has consistently found
national regulations on gambling to be restrictions on the
fundamental freedoms justified by reasons of overriding public
interest.74 These restrictions must not discriminate on the basis
of nationality and must be proportionate.75 The proportionality
analysis requires that the national regulation be a suitable and
necessary means to the stated end.76
74. See Santa Casa, [2009] E.C.R. I-7633, ¶ 57 (finding that there are “significant
moral, religious, and cultural differences between the Member States,” and thus it is in
within each Member States’ discretion to decide what regulation is needed to protect
cited interests); see also Sjöberg & Gerdin, Joined Cases 447 & 448/08, [2010] E.C.R. I6921, ¶ 37 (observing that in gambling regulation there are significant differences
between Member States, and allowing that it is up to each State to enact legislation that
protects different interests); Green Paper, supra note 3, at 11 (citing certain overriding
interests like consumer protection that have been recognized by the CJEU as
justifications for restrictions on free provision of services).
75. See TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 4, art. 5(4), 2012 O.J. C 326, at 18 (“(4)
Under the principle of proportionality, the content and form of Union action shall not
exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties”); see also Placanica,
[2007] E.C.R. I-1891, ¶¶ 48, 58 (holding that restrictive legislation must satisfy the
proportionality analysis); Sporting Exchange Ltd. (t/a Betfair) v. Minister van Justitie,
Case C-203/08, [2010] 3 C.M.L.R. 41, ¶ 29 (establishing that national courts must
determine that the regulations are proportionate to the stated objectives).
76. See Gebhard, [1995] E.C.R. I-4165, ¶ 37 (“[N]ational measures liable to hinder
or make less attractive the exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty
must fulfill four conditions: they must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner; they
must be justified by imperative requirements in the general interest; they must be
suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue; and they must
not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it.”); see also Gambelli, [2003] E.C.R. I13031, ¶¶ 64–65 (citing the suitability and necessity language of Gebhard); Lindman,
[2003] E.C.R. I-13543, ¶ 25 (finding restrictions must be analyzed for proportionality
and appropriateness under Gebhard). Suitability requires that the means employed
must be adequate or appropriate to attain the stated ends. See BARNARD, supra note 9,
at 177 (citing NV United Foods and PVBA Aug. Van den Abeele v. Belgium, Case
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Where the Member State adopts a system of licensing of
gambling operators, the CJEU requires transparency and an
impartial, competitive procedure for granting licenses. 77
Monopolies and quotas on the number of licensed operators
can be justified, but they must reflect a “genuine diminution in
gambling opportunities” and limit gambling in a “consistent
and systematic manner” across the sector.78 Also, because the
national legislatures often do not distinguish in their regulations
among gambling marketing channels, the assessment of
compatibility carried out by the CJEU does not distinguish
between online and in situ gambling.79
The CJEU has, however, recognized that the risks of online
gambling to consumers are different and potentially greater
than those posed by land-based gambling due to the constant
accessibility of Internet and the lack of contact between player
and operator. 80 Though the CJEU has acknowledged the
132/80, [1981] E.C.R. 995, ¶ 28). When considering necessity, the CJEU balances the
burden placed on the regulated conduct against the benefits to the stated objective
pursued by the Member State. See BARNARD, supra note 9, at 177; see also HARTLEY,
supra note 2, at 123 (arguing that the necessity analysis is in place to safeguard against
overbroad Union legislation).
77. See Doukas, supra note 60, at 244 (describing the principles applied to limit
restrictions on freedoms and the procedure required of licensing schemes); see also
Placanica, [2007] E.C.R. I-1891, ¶¶ 61–64 (outlining the requirements of licensing
tender procedures such as impartiality).
78. Questore di Verona v. Diego Zenatti (“Zenatti”), Case C-67/98, [1999] E.C.R.
I-07289, ¶¶ 35–36 (finding a limitation on gambling acceptable if it aims at bringing
about a “genuine diminution in gambling opportunities”); see Gambelli, [2003] E.C.R. I13031, ¶¶ 62, 67 (citing the “genuine diminution” language in Zenatti and reiterating
that restrictions based on overriding policy justifications must limit gambling activity
“in a consistent and systematic manner”); Placanica, [2007] E.C.R. I-1891, ¶ 53
(combining the language in Zenatti and Gambelli to hold that restrictions must aim at “a
genuine diminution of gambling opportunities and [limiting] activities in that sector in
a consistent and systematic manner”).
79. Zeturf, [2011] 3 C.M.L.R. 30, ¶ 76 (applying an “overall assessment” instead of
a distribution-channel-specific assessment); see also Anagnostaras, supra note 56, at 199
(arguing that Zeturf makes it clear that online gambling is not a separate market but a
separate distribution channel of the greater gambling market).
80. See Ladbrokes, [2010] 3 C.M.L.R. 40, ¶ 55 (“Online games of chance involve
different and more substantial risks of fraud against consumers mainly due to lack of
direct contact.”); see also Santa Casa, [2009] E.C.R. I-7633, ¶ 70 (contending that the
lack of contact between the operator and consumer involves a “more substantial” risk
of fraud compared to in situ gambling); Opinion of Advocate General Bot, Santa Casa,
[2009] E.C.R. I-7633, ¶ 267 (finding the “permanent availability of the opportunity to
play, the frequency of wins, its enticing or attractive nature, the possibility of staking
large sums, the availability of credit in order to play, the location of games at places
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possibly of greater social risks posed by online gambling, it
applies the same analysis to both online and conventional
gaming legislation.
2. The Early Preliminary Rulings on Compatibility
The basic guiding principles of the compatibility analysis
were developed in highly deferential judgments relating to
regulations of territory-based gambling operations, and their
application to online gambling operations is not always clear.
This developmental period in the CJEU’s case law in the 1990s
led to the view that Member States have a large margin of
discretion in regulating gambling on the basis of overriding
policy objectives.81 In Her Majesty’s Customs and Excise v. Gerhart
Schindler and Jörg Schindler, the CJEU accepted the United
Kingdom’s justifications for the regulation without any analysis
of the social repercussions of gambling.82 By the end of the
decade the CJEU began to move towards a stricter analysis with
the decision in Questore di Verona v. Diego Zenatti.83 There, the
where people can play on an impulse and, finally, the fact that there is no information
campaign regarding the risks of gaming” to be especially troubling aspects of online
gaming).
81. Zenatti, [1999] E.C.R. I-07289, ¶¶ 33–34 (finding gambling regulation to fall
“within the margin of appreciation” the CJEU grants national authorities); see
Associaçāo Nacional de Operadores de Máquinas Recreativas (Anomar) and Others v.
Estado português (Anomar), Case C-6/01, [2003] E.C.R. I-08621, ¶¶ 78, 87
(recognizing the discretion granted to Member States in relation to gambling
regulation). Anomar dealt with a challenge to Portuguese monopoly regulations. See id.
¶¶ 2, 7, 28 (explaining that Portuguese national law grants the right to operate
gambling facilities solely to the State and the action at hand challenges this regulatory
framework). Anomar was decided two months prior to Gambelli by the Third Chamber,
but lacked the more searching analysis employed by the full Court of Justice in
Gambelli. See id. ¶ 1 (receiving the reference on January 8, 2001 and deciding the case
on September 11, 2003). But see Gambelli, [2003] E.C.R. I-13031, ¶ 1 (receiving the
reference on June 22, 2001, and deciding the matter on November 6, 2003).
82. Schindler, [1994] E.C.R. I-1078, ¶¶ 57–59, 63 (holding crime prevention and
consumer protection to justify restriction on the freedom to provide services without
examining justifications further or calling for support on the record); see Doukas &
Anderson, supra note 60, at 240 (finding that the CJEU in Schindler did not even apply a
proportionality test).
83. See Zenatti, [1999] E.C.R. I-07289. But see Julia Hörnle, Online Gambling in the
European Union: A Tug of War Without a Winner? 10 (Queen Mary Univ. of London,
School of Law, Legal Stud. Research Paper No 48/2010), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1593249 (arguing that Zenatti applies the same “soft” proportionality test as
Läärä and discusses gambling in the same “moral, religious, and cultural” framework as
Schindler which grants Member States great discretion).
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CJEU asked the national court to examine the policy objectives
for a “genuine” desire to reduce gambling, and to ensure that
the tax revenues were only an “incidental” benefit to reduction
and channeling of gambling activities.84 These early rulings of
the CJEU from 1994 and 1999 established that gambling
regulations restrict the provision of services but were highly
deferential to the prerogatives of the national legislatures in
regulating gambling activity.85 This highly deferential treatment
granted to the Member States far exceeded the scope of the
exceptions granted by Articles 52 and 61 TFEU to the
fundamental freedoms and was not true to the goals of the
internal market.
The CJEU reasoned in Schindler in 1994 that because of the
differing moral and cultural perceptions of gambling from
nation to nation, the restrictions imposed by the United
Kingdom on gambling activity were justified on social objectives
grounds.86 Thus, as long as gambling regulations are applied
evenhandedly, it is within a Member State’s discretion to restrict
the activity.87
In 1999, the CJEU in Markku Juhani Läärä, Cotswold
Microsystems Ltd. and Oy Transatlantic Software Ltd. v.
Kihlakunnansyyttäjä (Jyväskylä) and Suomen valtio (Finnish State)
84 . See Zenatti, [1999] E.C.R. I-07289, ¶¶ 35–36 (calling for the “genuine
diminution in gambling opportunities” and the guarantee that financial benefits are
only “incidental” to the larger policy justifications for restricting gambling within a
Member State); see also Doukas & Anderson, supra note 60, at 242 (characterizing the
deference granted to the national court as a “mitigation” of the proportionality test).
85. See SPORTS BETTING, supra note 2, at 34 (discussing the CJEU’s position in
Schindler as “erring on the side of national regulations and justifications” for restrictive
licensing and monopolies); see also Doukas & Anderson, supra note 60, at 242 (assessing
the preliminary rulings on gambling regulations from Schindler to Zenatti as a
“disappointment”).
86. Schindler, [1994] E.C.R. I-1078, ¶¶ 57–59, 63 (finding the prevention of crime
and protection of consumers to justify restriction on the freedom to provide services).
In this ruling, the CJEU also confirmed for the first time that gambling is an economic
activity that falls within the purview of the Treaty. Id. ¶¶ 19, 25, 34 (finding that
“lotteries constitute an economic activity, within the meaning of the Treaty” and are to
be regarded as services within the meaning of the Treaty.). This case concerned
German agents of a lottery advertising and possibly importing tickets into the United
Kingdom in violation of regulations on gambling. Id. ¶¶ 3–5 (stating that the
Schindlers sent applications via mail to the United Kingdom from the Netherlands for
the German lottery Süddeutsche Klassenlotterie (“SKL”) in violation of UK law).
87. Id. ¶¶ 47–48, 52, 61 (regarding the legislation as not discriminatory on the
basis of nationality).
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(“Läärä”) again granted a national legislature great deference
when it found a monopoly that completely eliminates
competition and progress in the marketplace to be
proportionate to the Finnish legislature’s goals of protecting
consumers against the dangers of gambling and preventing
fraud.88 Thus, some scholars have argued that with Läärä the
CJEU adopted a “soft” proportionality test that grants Member
States substantial discretion in promulgating restrictions on the
gambling market.89
Also in 1999, the CJEU issued a ruling to the Italian courts
in Zenatti that emphasized the discretion granted to the Member
States and did not examine the proportionality of the Italian
regulations in depth.90 The CJEU found the Italian licensing
restrictions to infringe on the freedom to provide services but
did not find them impermissible. 91 Limiting gambling to an
exclusive group of operators could channel and control
gambling opportunities, and this limitation could be acceptable
if it reflects a desire to bring about “a genuine diminution in

88. Markku Juhani Läärä, Cotswold Microsystems Ltd. and Oy Transatlantic
Software Ltd. v. Kihlakunnansyyttäjä (Jyväskylä) and Suomen valtio (Finnish State)
(Läärä), Case C-124/97, [1999] E.C.R. I-06067, ¶¶ 28–29, 31, 33, 42–43 (finding the
monopoly not to be disproportionate or to “go beyond what is necessary in order to
achieve” the legislature’s stated objectives). The case involved a British gaming
machines exporter who was fined for selling machines without a license in Finland,
where the Finnish government had granted a monopoly on slot machines to a nonprofit. Id. ¶¶ 3–6 (stating that the gaming machine monopoly license grant was specific
to the distribution and operation of slot machines in Finland).
89. See BARNARD, supra note 9, at 392 (“[I]n Läärä [the CJEU] did examine
proportionality but its approach was remarkably hands off.”); see also Hörnle, supra
note 83, at 9 (calling the proportionality analysis in Läärä “soft”); SPORTS BETTING,
supra note 2, at 36 (discussing the CJEU’s stance on moral corruption in gambling and
how easily it granted latitude to the national authorities).
90. Zenatti, [1999] E.C.R. I-07289, ¶¶ 14–16, 33–34 (observing the deference
granted to national authorities in regulating gambling activity and noting the need for
proportionality without actually engaging in an analysis). In Zenatti, an Italian agent for
a British bookmaker was found to violate the Italian regulations that limit sports betting
to a small number of licensed operators. Id. ¶¶ 3–7 (outlining the regulatory scheme in
Italy, which Mr. Zenatti was found by Italian authorities to be violating). The Italian
legislation’s stated objectives were fraud prevention, consumer protection from the
harms of gambling, and preventing gambling from being a source of private profit. Id.
¶¶ 30–31 (summarizing policy objectives cited by the Italian legislation in
implementing gambling regulations).
91. Id. ¶¶ 26–27 (finding the legislation non-discriminatory but a restriction on
the freedom to provide services).
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gambling opportunities.” 92 Furthermore, protecting the taxes
levied on bookmaking in Italy must only be an “incidental
beneficial consequence” and not the true purpose behind the
legislation.93
This line of cases granted a large margin of discretion to
Member States. Here, the Member States were allowed to
regulate gambling in contravention of the fundamental
freedoms, and the CJEU sometimes did not even employ a
proportionality analysis. 94 Following this highly deferential
period, the CJEU developed the two conflicting compatibility
frameworks discussed in Part II of this Note.
3. The Treaty of Lisbon Comes into Force and the September
8th German Triad
The Treaty of Lisbon entered into force on December 1,
2009, which altered the structure of the European Union in
order to better face global challenges and uphold the core
values of the European Union’s institutions.95 In light of this
change, the Grand Chamber released a triad of rulings on
gambling regulation compatibility in 2010 that realigned the
CJEU’s judicial policy in this field after the two conflicting
frameworks employed in Gambelli and in Santa Casa discussed in
Part II of this Note. 96 The German Triad reestablished the
rigorous proportionality and consistency analyses employed in
92. Id. ¶¶ 35–36 ([A] limitation is acceptable only if . . . it reflects a concern to
bring about a genuine diminution in gambling opportunities . . . .”).
93. Id. ¶ 36 (citing language in Schindler in claiming that financial benefits cannot
be the primary motivation behind legislation that restricts the freedom to provide
services).
94. See Doukas & Anderson, supra note 60, at 240 (discussing the lack of a
proportionality test in Schindler); see also SPORTS BETTING, supra note 2, at 34 (arguing
the CJEU in Schindler “err[ed] on the side of national regulations and justifications” for
restrictive licensing and monopolies).
95. See Taking Europe into the 21st Century, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/lisbon_
treaty/take/index_en.htm (stating that in this ever more interconnected world, the
Treaty of Lisbon alters the structures of the EU’s institutions and thus “the EU is more
democratic and its core values are better served.”).
96. See Winner Wetten GmBH, Bürgermeisterin der Stadt Bergheim (Winner
Wetten), Case C-409/06, [2010] E.C.R. I-8015; see also Markus Stoß v. Wetteraukreis
(Stoß and Others), Joined Cases 316, 358–360, 409, & 410/07, [2010] E.C.R. I-8069;
Carmen Media Group Ltd. v. Land Schleswig-Holstein, Innenminister des Landes
Schleswig-Holstein (Carmen Media), Joined Cases 316, 358-360, 409, & 410/07, [2010]
E.C.R. I-8149.
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Gambelli and further reasserted the primacy of EU law.97 The
Grand Chamber returned to a more faithful interpretation of
the Treaties, allowing the Member States’ the ability to restrict
the provision of services.
On September 8, 2010, the Grand Chamber gave
preliminary rulings in three major cases: Winner Wetten GmBH,
Bürgermeisterin der Stadt Bergheim, Markus Sto v. Wetteraukreis
(“Sto and Others”), and Carmen Media Group Ltd. v. Land
Schleswig-Holstein, Innenminister des Landes Schleswig-Holstein. 98
Winner Wetten dealt with the continued application of a German
public monopoly statute during a transitional period to a
regulatory scheme more compliant with EU law.99 In Sto and
Others, the defendants were agents of companies licensed in
other Member States who were operating in Germany in
contravention of the German monopoly system.100 In Carmen
Media, the CJEU analyzed the compatibility of a total prohibition

97. See SPORTS BETTING, supra note 2, at 74 (deeming Carmen Media a “pivotal
moment” for the CJEU’s jurisprudence, the future of gambling in the European
Union, and “an eventual liberalisation of the industry”); see also Winner Wetten, [2010]
E.C.R. I-8149, ¶ 53 (“[I]n accordance with the principle of the precedence of Union
law, provisions of the Treaty and directly applicable measures of the institutions have
the effect, in their relations with the internal law of the Member States, merely by
entering into force, of rendering automatically inapplicable any conflicting provision of
national law.” (citing Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA,
Case 106/77, [1978] E.C.R. 629, ¶ 17; The Queen v. Sec’y of State for Transp. ex parte
Factortame, Case C-213/89, [1990] E.C.R. I 2433, ¶ 18)).
98. See Winner Wetten, [2010] E.C.R. I-8149; see also Stoß and Others, Joined Cases
316, 358-360, 409, & 410/07, [2010] E.C.R. I-8069; Carmen Media, [2010] E.C.R. I-8149.
99. Winner Wetten, [2010] E.C.R. I-8149, ¶¶ 63–67 (describing caselaw that allows
for the continued application of a national law found to be incompatible to EU law for
an interim period but finding that inapplicable to the case at hand). The gambling
operator Winner Wetten was found to be operating in violation of the German nonprofit monopoly grant. Id. ¶¶ 15–18 (describing Winner Wetten, a gambling operator
established in Malta, and the company’s administrative complaint brought against
German officials). Winner Wetten again raised the issue of inconsistency because the
German authorities advertised and encouraged consumers to use their gambling
services while claiming to pursue the overriding objective of consumer protection. Id.
¶ 20 (citing the national court’s consideration of the inconsistency between a restrictive
consumer protection policy and encouraging consumers to participate in the
authorized gambling activities).
100. Stoß and Others, [2010] E.C.R. I-8069, ¶¶ 14, 16, 28–30 (outlining the factual
and legal background of the preliminary ruling and finding the multiple defendants to
be agents of companies operating without authorization in Germany) .
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on online gambling with the German monopoly system during
its transitional period.101
Most notably, the Grand Chamber in Winner Wetten began
the discussion of the substance of the law with a forceful
reiteration of the idea of primacy: provisions of the Treaty and
secondary law automatically render inapplicable any conflicting
national legislation.102 Moreover, the Grand Chamber discussed
the principle of cooperation, which obligates Member States to
apply EU law.103 Thus, the ruling—that the public monopoly
regulation was a restriction that could not continue to apply
during a transitional period because the regulation did not
consistently and systematically limit gambling—came as no
surprise.104
The Grand Chamber’s September 8th German Triad
rulings reaffirm the primacy of EU law in Winner Wetten and
establish that a Member State, here Germany, cannot violate EU
law even briefly. In Sto and Others and Carmen Media, the Grand
Chamber stressed the importance of consistency in the means of
national gambling regulation to the legislature’s stated
objectives. 105 Any restriction of the free provision of services
must be consistent and proportionate to the stated overriding

101 . Carmen Media, [2010] E.C.R. I-8149, ¶¶ 23–24, 111 (detailing the
unsuccessful license application of Gibraltar-based online gambling operator Carmen
Media in Land Schleswig-Holstein, in the context of transitional measures applied at
the time of the challenge in Germany).
102 . Winner Wetten, [2010] E.C.R. I-8149, ¶ 53 (“[I]n accordance with the
principle of the precedence of Union law, provisions of the Treaty and directly
applicable measures of the institutions have the effect, in their relations with the
internal law of the Member States, merely by entering into force, of rendering
automatically inapplicable any conflicting provision of national law.” (citing Simmenthal,
[1978] E.C.R. 629, ¶ 17; The Queen v. Sec’y of State for Transp. ex parte Factortame, [1990]
E.C.R. I 2433, ¶ 18)).
103. Id. ¶ 55 (holding that Member States are obligated to apply Union law under
the principle of cooperation (citing Simmenthal, [1978] E.C.R. 629, ¶¶ 16, 21;
Factortame, [1990] E.C.R. I 2433, ¶ 19)).
104. Id. ¶ 69 (finding the regulation to be a restriction on the freedom of
establishment and the free provision of services).
105. Though the CJEU in Stoß and Others found that a monopoly also could be
justified because it allows greater control over the gambling sector and its inherent
risks, it could only be justified in the context of a high level of consumer protection
that the regulation consistently and systematically pursues. Stoß and Others, [2010]
E.C.R. I-8069, ¶¶ 83, 95–98 (holding restrictions on gambling activities can only be
justified only consistently and systematically pursuing an overriding public policy).
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public policy.106 The CJEU reaffirmed, however, its belief that
mutual recognition was inapplicable to the field of gambling
regulation at this point in time.107 Again, the CJEU reiterated
the unique risks associated with gambling online and posited
that in light of this, regulating this channel of gambling in a
different manner may be justified.108
4. The Closer Examination of Policy Objectives and the
Reinforcement of the Principle of Non-discrimination
In accordance with this judicial posture, the Fourth
Chamber and Eighth Chamber released rulings from 2010 to
2012 calling for consistency and more evidence of the necessity
of gambling regulations in Member States. Furthermore, the
CJEU took a firm stance against gambling regulations that
discriminated on the basis of nationality. On September 9, 2010,
one day after the Grand Chamber handed down three
preliminary rulings regarding the German regulatory scheme,
the Fourth Chamber issued a preliminary ruling regarding

106. See Carmen Media, [2010] E.C.R. I-8149, ¶ 63 (finding disparities in gambling
regulation, for example, where certain games are subject to a public monopoly and
others to a licensing system, does not render the regulation unsuitable). It is within the
Member State’s discretion to determine if it is necessary to prohibit or restrict
gambling activities. Id. ¶ 46 (granting discretion to the Member States to determine
what regulation is necessary and finding the necessity and proportionality must “be
assessed having regard to the objectives pursued and the level of protection
sought . . . .”). However, the CJEU in Stoß and Others and Carmen Media was particularly
concerned with inconsistent advertisements for monopolies that trivialized gambling or
gave it a positive image, especially if the legislature’s stated objective is reduction of
gambling. Stoß and Others, [2010] E.C.R. I-8069, ¶ 103 (concluding that advertising to
channel consumers cannot trivialize gambling and give the activity a positive image);
Carmen Media, [2010] E.C.R. I-8149, ¶ 71 (regarding the expansionist policy unsuitable
for pursuing a reduction in gambling opportunities).
107. See Stoß and Others, [2010] E.C.R. I-8069, ¶¶ 109–10, 112 (rejecting the
application of mutual recognition in this context and finding the question
inappropriate because “a duty mutually to recognise authorisations issued by the
various Member States cannot exist having regard to the current state of EU law”).
108. Carmen Media, [2010] E.C.R. I-8149, ¶ 111 (holding that a ban on online
gambling may be a suitable means of protecting consumers and fighting gambling
addiction); see also id. ¶¶ 101–03 (highlighting particular risks associated with online
gambling—especially the lack of direct contact, the ease of access, the round-the-clock
availability, the isolation, the anonymity, and the absence of social control); Stoß and
Others, [2010] E.C.R. I-8069, ¶ 84 (indicating the referring national court was
apprehensive about applying the public monopoly framework to the Internet where
compliance may be harder to ensure).
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Austrian regulations in Ernst Engelmann.109 The following year,
in 2011, the Eighth Chamber issued a preliminary ruling in
Zeturf Ltd. v. Premier Ministre regarding the French non-profit
horserace-betting monopoly. 110 The same year, the Fourth
Chamber issued a ruling in Dickinger & Ömer, stating as in Zeturf
that in order to find a monopoly justified and necessary, the
regulations must guarantee a “particularly high level of
protection.” 111 In February 2012, the Fourth Chamber again
issued a preliminary ruling on online gambling regulations in
Costa & Cifone, in which protectionist Italian licensing law
required a minimum distance between existing operators and
previous applicants.112 This series of rulings adhered closely to
109. Ernst Engelmann, Case C-64/08, [2010] E.C.R. I-8219, ¶¶ 2–3. In Engelmann, a
German national was operating gambling in Austria in contravention of Austrian
legislation. Id. ¶¶ 17–18 (outlining the factual background of the dispute in the main
proceedings). Here, the CJEU found the Austrian regulation of gambling to be
discriminatory and disproportionate and therefore incompatible with EU law. Id. ¶¶
28, 32–37 (finding the regulation a restriction on the freedom of establishment,
specifically secondary establishment in Austria, and discriminatory against businesses
headquartered in other Member States).
110. Zeturf, [2011] 3 C.M.L.R. 30, ¶¶ 1–2, 26–27 (describing the appeal to the
French government by Zeturf, a Maltese-licensed online operator that provided
horserace-betting services via the Internet in France, to repeal the monopoly grant).
Note that at the time of this ruling, the French legislation at issue had already been
amended to a licensing scheme, but the ruling nevertheless stands for the principle
that Member States must maintain consistency and provide support for the harms cited
on the record. See Commission, On-line Gambling: Commission Welcomes France’s
Decision to Open Its Gambling Market and Closes Infringement Procedure,
IP/10/1597 (2010); see also Loi n. 2010-476 de mai 2010 relative à l’ouverture à la
concurrence et à la régulation du sectuer des jeux d’argent et de hasard en ligne [Law
2010-476 of May 12, 2010 on the Introduction of Competition and Sector Regulation of
Gambling and Online Gambling], available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affich
Texte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000022204510
(allowing cross-border provision of
services through a licensing system as opposed to the previous monopoly system).
111. Dickinger & Ömer, [2011] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 54 (delivered Sept. 15, 2011) (not
yet reported) (holding that it is for the referring court to determine the intent,
objectives, and necessity of the restrictive regulations). The defendants alleged that the
primary objective of the Austrian legislature was increasing tax revenue, whereas the
government asserted that its main objective was consumer protection. Id. ¶¶ 2–5, 26,
52–53, 80–81, 84 (discussing the allegations of the defendants in the case who operated
the Maltese licensed website bet-at-home.com in contravention of Austrian law that,
among other things, (1) required the seat of the operation to be in Austria, (2)
considered the maximization of public revenue when awarding concessions, and (3)
prohibited setting up branches in other Member States)
112. Costa & Cifone, Joined Cases 72 & 77/10, [2011] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 58, 66, 89
(delivered Feb. 16, 2012) (not yet reported) (describing the Italian licensing law and
discussing the measures as protectionist). Mr. Costa and Mr. Cifone were agents of
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the principles laid down in the Treaties and the text of Articles
56 and 61.
This series of rulings by the CJEU is faithful to Articles 56
and 61 because the rulings stress the principle of nondiscrimination and the need for transparency.113 The Treaty of
Lisbon calls for the free provision of services and allows
restrictions on the provision of services in the public interest
only if they did not discriminate on the basis of nationality.114
Here, the CJEU called for more facts on the record to
demonstrate the harms linked to gambling in France and
Austria.115 The CJEU again demanded consistency between the
objectives cited by the national legislatures and the means
chosen to execute these objectives.116 The call for more evidence

Stanley International operating in Italy. Id. ¶ 2. In breach of EU law, Stanley
International was previously excluded from the Italian tendering procedure in 1999,
and in 2006, after the Italian authorities were uncooperative in tendering procedures,
brought suit. Id. ¶¶ 12–13, 20–27.
113 . Engelmann, [2010] E.C.R. I-8219, ¶¶ 32–33 (holding that regulations
requiring a gambling company to have its seat in Austria are discriminatory against
companies established in other Member States and a restriction against free
establishment in Austria); see Doukas, supra note 60, at 262 (finding the regulations in
Engelmann “manifest excesses of national discretion” incompatible with the Treaty);
Engelmann, [2010] E.C.R. I-8219, ¶¶ 37–39, 49–58 (finding the Austrian regulation
disproportionate as there are other methods available to monitor operator’s activities—
especially via the Internet—and emphasizing the lack of transparency in the licensetendering procedures because they were not based on objective criteria known in
advance, that is neither used arbitrary nor applied in a discriminatory manner); Costa
& Cifone, [2011] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 54–56 (delivered Feb. 16, 2012) (demanding that
national authorities comply with the principles of equal treatment and nondiscrimination in tendering procedures and maintain transparency). All rules and
requirements of the tendering procedure ought to be clear and precise so that
applicants have all the relevant information on hand when considering their tender
offer. Id. ¶ 73. This principle is further bolstered by the principle of legal certainty,
which calls for predictability in the law. Id. ¶ 74.
114. See TFEU, supra note 2, art. 56 (ex art. 49 TEC), 2012 O.J. C 326, at 70
(enacting the free provision of services); see also id. art. 61 (ex art. 54 TEC), at 71
(allowing derogations from article 56 so long as the regulations do not discriminate on
the basis of nationality).
115. Zeturf, [2011] 3 C.M.L.R. 30, ¶¶ 70, 72 (instructing the French national court
to determine whether, at the time the regulation was promulgated, there was evidence
that criminal and fraudulent activities linked to gambling were an issue in France); see
Dickinger & Ömer, [2011] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 67 (delivered Sept. 15, 2011) (arguing an
expansionist policy in Austria is inconsistent with the objective of consumer protection
unless the scale of criminal activity is “significant”).
116. Dickinger & Ömer, [2011] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 69 (delivered Sept. 15, 2011)
(stating that there is a difference between a “restrained commercial policy seeking only
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of the scale of the harms cited on the legislative record is
indicative of the more protective stance the CJEU is taking on
the fundamental freedoms.
5. The Potential Resurrection of the Principle of Mutual
Recognition
In July 2012, the Fourth Chamber issued two important
preliminary rulings dealing with Austrian and Latvian gambling
regulation. In HIT and HIT LARIX v. Bundesminister für Finanzen,
the CJEU’s ruling regarding advertising in Austria for Slovenian
casinos laid the foundation for the potential application of
mutual recognition in the gambling sector.117 Furthermore, in
Garkalns SIA v. Rīgas dome, the CJEU called for a probing inquiry
into the Latvian authorities’ intent and objective in restricting
the provision of gambling services in Riga.118 This analysis of the
consistency and proportionality of the national legislature’s
motives, coupled with the consideration of other neighboring
Member States’ interests, is more faithful to the European
Union ideal and economic goals.
In HIT and HIT Larix the CJEU determined that the
Austrian government cannot require other government’s
regulations to be identical to Austrian regulations, and it cannot
assume that other Member States’ regulations do not afford the
same degree of consumer protection.119 The CJEU stated that
national gambling regulations established to be essentially
to capture or retain the existing market” and a policy seeking to expand the overall
market).
117. HIT and HIT LARIX v. Bundesminister für Finanzen (HIT and HIT LARIX),
Case C-176/11, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 2–9 (delivered July 12, 2012) (not yet reported)
(describing the background of the dispute where two Slovenian gambling operators
applied for Austrian advertising permits and were rejected because the authorities
found the Slovenian regulations less protective—a reason the CJEU found inadequate).
118. Garkalns SIA v. Rīgas dome (Garkalns SIA), Case C-470/11, [2012] E.C.R.
I____, ¶¶ 1–2, 33 (delivered July 19, 2012) (not yet reported) (outlining the facts of the
proceedings concerning the Rīga authorities’ refusal to grant Latvian operator
Garkalns a license to operate an amusement arcade in a densely populated part of
Riga).
119. HIT and HIT LARIX, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 32 (delivered July 12, 2012)
(stating that Slovenian regulations against gambling cannot be required to be identical
to regulations in Austria and regarding the difference between national regulations as
inadequate grounds for rejecting an advertising application); see Santa Casa, [2009]
E.C.R. I-7633, ¶¶ 69–70 (rejecting the application of mutual recognition in the online
gambling field).
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equivalent is more loyal to the Treaties’ economic goal of
establishing a free market than allowing disparate and
discordant regulation.
6. Member States Have Two Options for Compliance: Reform or
Liberalize
In 2013, the CJEU dealt with two major compatibility
challenges in the gambling regulation field. In Stanleybet et al. v.
Ypourgos Oikonomias kai Oikonomikon, the Fourth Chamber found
the Greek monopoly system would likely be found incompatible
with the Treaty of Lisbon, and the CJEU made the explicit policy
recommendation to either overhaul the monopoly system or
move to a more liberal licensing system.120 Most importantly, the
Third Chamber in Biasci and Others found that a national
regulation that bars cross-border provision of gambling services
is inherently incompatible with the Treaty of Lisbon.121 In Biasci
and Others and Stanleybet, the CJEU has been increasingly willing
to make policy recommendations and accord less deference to
the national legislatures in determining gambling regulations.
The CJEU’s more active position coincides with the
Commission’s reopening of infringement proceedings against a
number of Member States.122 In Biasci and Others and Stanleybet,
the CJEU is working in tandem with the Commission to uphold
the fundamental freedoms and the Treaty of Lisbon.

120. Stanleybet et. al. v. Ypourgos Oikonomias kai Oikonomikon (Stanleybet),
Joined Cases 186 & 209/11, [2013] E.C.R. I____ (delivered Jan. 24, 2013), ¶ 36, 46–47
(finding the Greek grant of a monopoly to OPAP impermissible under EU law,
especially where the monopoly is not “genuinely meet[ing] the concern to reduce
opportunities for gambling.”). OPAP is an operator listed on the Athens Stock
Exchange with the State shareholding never falling below a 34% stake in the company.
Id. ¶¶ 6-7, 12. The State also retained the right to appoint the majority of the members
of the board of directors of OPAP even though it was a minority shareholder. Id. ¶ 12.
The majority of the Greek national court believes that the OPAP monopoly scheme is
incompatible with EU law because there is no stated objective that justifies the strict
scheme and the expansion of gambling in Greece has been uncontrolled. Id. ¶ 17.
121 . Biasci and Others, Joined Cases 660/11 & 8/12, [2013] E.C.R. I____
(delivered Sept. 12, 2013) (not yet reported), ¶¶ 12–13 (considering again the Italian
licensing scheme where applicants were agents of Austrian online gambling operator
Goldbet and holding the legislation incompatible because it precluded all cross-border
gambling activity).
122. See supra notes 69–72 and accompanying text (discussing the reopening of
infringement proceedings against noncompliant Member States).
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The Fourth Chamber in Stanleybet made a policy
recommendation to the Greek legislature: either reform the
current monopoly system to control gambling or change over to
a liberalized licensing scheme that may better protect
consumers.123 A licensing system would allow the Member State
to retain discretion but would open up the market to controlled
competition. In Biasci and Others, the Third Chamber firmly
stated that prohibiting all cross-border gambling services is
incompatible with EU law, though it reestablished the current
inapplicability of mutual recognition. 124 Moreover, the CJEU
emphasized the need for transparency and that economic
protectionism cannot justify a restriction on free trade.125
Most recently, in April 2014, the CJEU decided the case of
Pfleger and Others, which largely followed the opinion released by
AG Eleanor Sharpston. 126 Continuing with the active line of
reasoning in Stanleybet and Biasci and Others, the CJEU found the
regulations in Pfleger and Others inconsistent and
disproportionate with the Austrian legislature’s consumer
protection objectives due to the apparent true purpose of
increasing tax revenues and the aggressive advertising campaign
the government is currently undertaking.127 Notably, the CJEU
123. Stanleybet, [2013] E.C.R. I___ (delivered Jan. 24, 2013), ¶¶ 45–47 (advising
that, although “free, undistorted competition” might have negative effects, a Member
State has two policy choices: reform a monopoly to make it compatible or consider that
liberalization of the market better ensures consumer protection in a system like an
administrative permit scheme).
124. Biasci and Others, [2013] E.C.R. I___ (delivered Sept. 12, 2013), ¶¶ 37, 40–43
(drawing a red line finding that a national legislation that precludes all cross-border
gambling activities is incompatible with EU law and re-establishing that there is no
obligation of mutual recognition of licenses issued by other Member States).
125. Id. ¶¶ 31–33, 38 (requiring that licensing procedures be transparent and
“clear, precise and unequivocal” and reiterating the holding from Costa & Cifone that
economic protectionism is not an overriding policy objective).
126. Pfleger and Others, Case 390/12, [2014] E.C.R. I____ (delivered on Apr. 30,
2014); see also Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, Pfleger and Others, Case C390/12, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 25 (delivered Nov. 14, 2013) (discussing case involving
the Austrian gaming machine license regulations and their proportionality).
127. Pfleger and Others, [2014] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 54, 56 (delivered on Apr. 30, 2014)
(concluding that Article 56 TFEU precludes the Austrian regulations because the
regulations, whose “real purpose” is increasing tax revenue, do not consistently and
systematically pursue the cited consumer protection objectives); see Opinion of
Advocate General Sharpston, Pfleger and Others, [2014] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 53–54
(delivered on Apr. 30, 2014) (noting the CJEU holds increasing revenues cannot justify
restricting the freedom to provide services and that the referring court found hypocrisy
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confirmed for the first time that the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union applies where the free provision
of services is unjustifiably restricted.128 In these three cases, the
CJEU is increasingly working in harmony with the Commission,
which reopened infringement proceedings, to help the
Commission fulfill its role as guardian of the Treaties.
II. THE CJEU’S APPROACH TO ONLINE GAMBLING
Part II summarizes the CJEU’s competing approaches to
the compatibility analysis of gambling regulations with the
Treaty and European Union laws and examines whether the
CJEU’s analysis is true to the underlying principles of the EU
internal market. Beginning with Gambelli in 2003, Part II.A
discusses the CJEU’s close examination of the consistency and
the proportionality of the means of Member States’ gambling
regulations with the ends sought to be achieved, an analysis that
vigorously polices Member States’ restrictions on the freedom to
provide services. In contrast, Part II.B compares the analysis in
Gambelli and Placanica with the CJEU’s reversion to a more
deferential stance in the 2009 Santa Casa ruling, which is
unfaithful to the fundamental freedoms of the Treaty of Lisbon
and coincided with a lull in the Commission’s infringement
proceedings.
A. The Stricter Assessment Outlined by the CJEU in Gambelli and
Placanica
Beginning in 2003 with the CJEU’s preliminary ruling in
Gambelli, the CJEU undertook a probing analysis of the Member
States’ means and ends in restricting gambling within their
nation’s borders. Three cases—Gambelli, Lindman, and
Placanica129—laid down a compatibility framework that ratcheted
in the stated objectives and the “colossal expenditure” on “aggressive” advertising,
which the CJEU has found inconsistent in the past (citing Dickinger & Ömer, [2011]
E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 58, 68)).
128. Pfleger and Others, [2014] E.C.R. I___, ¶ 59 (delivered on Apr. 30, 2014)
(supporting the AGs finding that an unjustified restriction on the free provision of
services is impermissible under the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union).
129. Gambelli, [2003] E.C.R. I-13031; see Lindman, [2003] E.C.R. I-13543; Placanica,
[2007] E.C.R. I-1891.
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up the proportionality and consistency analyses and gave less
deference to national legislatures in comparison to the previous
stance iterated in Schindler and Zenatti.130 In this way, these three
cases signal the CJEU’s greater adherence to the tenets of the
internal market and the Treaties.131
In its 2003 decision Gambelli, the CJEU questioned and
examined the actual motive behind a Member State’s restrictive
regulation. There, the defendants were betting agents
representing a British gambling operator, Stanley International,
and were found to be acting in violation of the strict licensing
scheme under Italian regulation.132 The CJEU found the Italian
legislation, which criminalized unlicensed gambling operations,
to be a restriction on the freedom of establishment and the
freedom to provide services called for by the Treaties.133 The
Italian legislation made it “impossible in practice” for public
companies in other Member States to be licensed in Italy, and it
was thus a restriction on the freedom of establishment.134
The CJEU also challenged the proportionality and necessity
of the criminal penalties imposed on the defendant’s betting
agents, especially considering the advertising campaigns run by
130. See Hörnle, supra note 83, at 11 (arguing that Gambelli took a more “proactive stance” in questioning and analyzing the proportionality of the Italian
legislation); see also Alain-Laurent Verbeke, Gambling Regulation in Europe: Moving
Beyond Ambiguity and Hypocrisy, in IN THE SHADOW OF LUXEMBOURG 254 (Alan Littler et
al. eds., 2011) (stating that Gambelli and Placanica signal a swing in the pendulum
towards a stricter analysis than Schindler et al.); Schindler, [1994] E.C.R. I-1078; Zenatti,
[1999] E.C.R. I-07289.
131. See SPORTS BETTING, supra note 2, at 29 (recognizing Placanica to be “strong
confirmation” that there was a “clear turn towards liberalisation of the gambling sector
in Europe”)
132. Gambelli, [2003] E.C.R. I-13031, ¶ 10 (describing the factual background of
the case).
133. Id. ¶ 76 (holding that the Italian legislation that imposes criminal penalties
on violators of the licensing scheme is a restriction on the freedom of establishment
and the freedom to provide services under EU law). But see Doukas & Anderson, supra
note 60, at 237 (finding that though the CJEU found the regulation a restriction, the
national court found the betting scheme proportionate and justified (citing Corte
Supreme di Cassazione (Sezioni Unite Penali), Judgment No. 111/04 of 26 April 2004
(Gesualdi), available at http://www.cortedicassazione.it/Notizie/Giurisprudenza
Comunitaria/CorteGiustizia/Scheda.asp?ID=473)).
134. Gambelli, [2003] E.C.R. I-13031, ¶ 48 (contending that the Italian legislation
functionally made it “impossible” for companies quoted on markets in other Member
States to obtain a license in Italy and therefore restricted the freedom of
establishment).
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the Italian government that encouraged consumption of Italy’s
own licensed gambling services.135 The CJEU found that the
government’s policy of expansion and advertisement was
inconsistent with consumer protection concerns, such as
reduction of the opportunity to gamble.136 The CJEU concluded
that restrictions on gambling services must limit betting activities
in “a consistent and systematic manner,” and found the
expansionist policy of the Italian government with respect to
domestic gambling operations to undermine this consistency.137
The CJEU also questioned whether the exclusion of listed
companies from license-tendering proceedings is discriminatory
against these companies because there are other less-restrictive
ways of preventing fraud.138 Furthermore, the judgment stressed
that prevention of decreasing tax revenue is not an overriding
general interest that can justify the restriction of fundamental
freedoms. 139 This more searching analysis than the one the
CJEU employed in Schindler, Läärä, and Zenatti of the gambling
regulation’s proportionality echoed points that had been raised,
but not discussed at length, in the earlier preliminary ruling on
Italian gambling regulation in Zenatti.140
Decided just six days after Gambelli in 2003, the Fifth
Chamber of the Court considered the compatibility of a Finnish
gambling regulation in Lindman. 141 Ms. Lindman, a Finnish
national residing in Finland, won money in a Swedish lottery
while on holiday and disputed the taxes levied on her winnings
by Finland on the grounds that winnings from Finnish lotteries

135. Id. ¶ 72 (urging the national court to view the necessity analysis in the
context of the harsh, disproportionate criminal penalties and the advertising scheme
employed by the state).
136. Id. ¶¶ 68–69 (considering the expansionist policy to be inconsistent with
consumer protection objectives).
137. Id. ¶ 67 (outlining that restrictions must serve the policy objectives in a
“consistent and systematic manner”).
138. Id. ¶ 74 (questioning the Italian legislature’s course of action where there are
other means of preventing criminal activities in the gambling sector).
139. Id. ¶¶ 61, 69 (noting that it is “settled case-law that the diminution or
reduction of tax revenue” is not an overriding policy justification under EU law).
140. See Zenatti, [1999] E.C.R. I-07289; supra notes 93–94 (discussing the need for
gambling regulation to bring about a “genuine diminution in gambling opportunities”
and for financial benefits to only be “incidental” to the other policy objectives of the
legislation).
141. Lindman, [2003] E.C.R. I-13543.
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are exempt from tax.142 Here, the Fifth Chamber found the tax
regulation discriminatory as it gave preference to Finnish lottery
winnings over taxable foreign lottery winnings. 143 The Fifth
Chamber also found the Finnish legislation lacked support on
the record for its stated social objectives and, thus, the Treaty
prohibited the discriminatory law.144
In 2007, the CJEU, once again, examined the compatibility
of Italian legislation. 145 In Placanica, Stanley International
challenged Italy’s limited licensing system as a restriction on the
freedom to provide services. 146 The CJEU stated that while
Member States can set policy objectives in regulating gambling,
each restrictive measure of the regulation must be subjected to a
proportionality test. 147 Again, the CJEU chastised the Italian
legislature for pursuing an expansionist policy with respect to
domestically licensed gambling where the aim was to increase
tax revenue, and criticized the legislation for failing to cite any
real justifications.148 In addition, the CJEU found that there were
less restrictive ways to prevent fraud than the licensing
procedure that imposed criminal penalties, and concluded that
the Treaty prohibited the legislation.149 Here, the CJEU openly
recommended that the Italian legislature either revoke and

142. Id. ¶¶ 2, 7–11 (outlining the question presented and the factual background
of the dispute).
143. Id. ¶ 21 (holding that the Finnish legislation clearly discriminates against
other Member States’ lotteries).
144. Id. ¶ 27 (finding the Finnish legislation incompatible with EU law as it is
discriminatory).
145. Placanica, [2007] E.C.R. I-1891 (issued by the Grand Chamber of the Court
of Justice).
146. Id. ¶¶ 43–44 (considering the Italian licensing scheme already considered in
Gambelli to be a restriction on the freedom of establishment and the freedom to
provide services); see Doukas & Anderson, supra note 60, at 247 (calling Stanley
International’s challenge unsurprising because the latitude Italy enjoyed in regulating
against crime in gambling allowed the regulation to serve as a pretext that primarily
served Italy’s “economic interests and budgetary considerations”).
147. Placanica, [2007] E.C.R. I-1891, ¶¶ 48–49 (“[A]lthough the Member States
are free to set the objectives of policy . . . the restrictive measures that they impose must
nevertheless satisfy the conditions laid down in the case-law of the CJEU as regards
their proportionality.”).
148. Id. ¶ 54 (criticizing the Italian legislature for failing to cite a policy objective
such as reduction of gambling activity or limiting gambling opportunities).
149. Id. ¶¶ 62–64 (citing the AG’s Opinion in point 125 for alternative and lessrestrictive means of regulating gambling and preventing fraud).
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redistribute the old licenses or open tenders on new licenses.150
Furthermore, the CJEU found that Italy could not apply
criminal penalties to the defendants where Italy had refused to
grant Stanley International a license in breach of Community
law.151
In these cases, the CJEU reconsidered the significant
deference granted to national legislatures in earlier preliminary
rulings on gambling activity. The CJEU’s more searching
analysis of the consistency and proportionality of gambling
regulations to social objectives is truer to the underlying
principles of the free market and the Treaty of Lisbon.152 The
thorough analysis of the national legislature’s true objectives
employed in Gambelli and Placanica is more in accordance with
the Treaty restrictions.153 Moreover, the CJEU stresses in Gambelli
that economic protectionism is not a valid justification for
restricting one of the fundamental freedoms. 154 The stricter
proportionality and consistency framework applied in these
rulings allow Member States to frame a national gambling policy
while still honoring the principles of the internal market.
B. A New Leniency and the Rejection of Mutual Recognition
Two years after the decision in Placanica, the CJEU fell back
to its former position of deference to the national legislatures
150. Id. ¶ 63 (finding an “appropriate course of action could be the revocation
and redistribution of the old licences or the award by public tender of an adequate
number of new licences”).
151. Id. ¶¶ 68–71 (rejecting the application of a criminal penalty for failing to
fulfill an administrative formality that was made impossible by the Member State itself).
152. See Doukas and Anderson, supra note 60, at 245–46 (describing the CJEU as
“anxious to circumscribe” Member State discretion considering the severity of Italian
laws and the fact that fundamental freedoms are being restricted due to concerns
about “the human passion for gambling” and associated criminality); see also Verbeke,
supra note 130, at 253–54 (finding the thorough analysis of consistency and
proportionality to be a stricter analysis of the respect given by Member States to the
supremacy of fundamental European principles).
153. See Hörnle, supra note 83, at 11–14 (citing the questioning of the “actual”
objectives of the Italian legislature in Gambelli as particularly thorough and finding that
Placanica gave the Italian court clear guidance and little room for maneuvering in its
judgment); see also Verbeke, supra note 130, at 254 (stating that Gambelli and Placanica
signal a swing in the pendulum towards a stricter analysis than Schindler et al.).
154. Gambelli, [2003] E.C.R. I-13031, ¶¶ 61, 69 (noting that it is “settled case-law”
that neither tax protectionism nor economic protectionism may serve as justifications
for restricting a fundamental freedom).
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with respect to gambling regulation.155 The CJEU no longer
engaged in a proportionality analysis and generally yielded to
the Member States’ legislatures.156 Moreover, the CJEU explicitly
rejected the idea of applying mutual recognition in this field
due to the unique risks posed by gambling, even though mutual
recognition has been applied with success in other complex
fields such as medical services.157 The CJEU’s deference to the
Member States despite the fact that the regulations at issue
potentially could be found disproportionate—the cases at hand
involve monopoly grants and total bans on gambling
advertisement—does not honor the principles of the Treaties
and fundamental freedoms.158
The Grand Chamber of the Court issued another
preliminary ruling in 2009 regarding the Portuguese monopoly
grant in the preliminary ruling for Santa Casa.159 The Portuguese
legislature had for many years granted a monopoly to the nonprofit Departamento de Jogos da Santa Casa da Misericórdia de
Lisboa (“Santa Casa”) and had extended this monopoly to
online gambling operations. 160 Bwin, an online gambling
operator based in Gibraltar, entered into a sponsorship
agreement with the First Football Division (the “Liga”) in
155. See SPORTS BETTING, supra note 2, at 53–60 (describing the “shockwave
[sent] across the continent and beyond” by the decision in Santa Casa that was a break
from the law after Placanica and stating that Santa Casa “perplexed” matters postGambelli and Placanica).
156. See SPORTS BETTING, supra note 2, at 29, (citing the Santa Casa judgment on
September 8, 2009 as “a day that delivered a significant blow to the private gambling
sector”); see also Dawes & Struckmann, supra note 12, at 261 (concluding that Santa
Casa was a “disappointment” of a judgment that did not engage in a detailed analysis of
the facts and resulted in a ruling based on “a profound misunderstanding of factual
reality”).
157. See Santa Casa, [2009] E.C.R. I-7633, ¶¶ 69–70 (rejecting the application of
mutual recognition in the online gambling field); see also Dawes & Struckmann, supra
note 12, at 260 (arguing there is “no apparent reason” why mutual recognition cannot
apply to the field of online gambling).
158. See Doukas & Anderson, supra note 60, at 276 (arguing that the deference
granted Member States allows for “de jure or de facto monopolistic or oligopolistic
organization” of the gambling market and creates a “game reserve for the exploitation
of Member States.”); see also Dawes & Struckmann, supra note 12, at 243 (arguing that
the CJEU’s approach in Santa Casa was “misguided” in light of precedent and
“economic reality.”).
159. Santa Casa, [2009] E.C.R. I-7633, ¶¶ 1–3 (describing the legal background of
the case).
160. Id. ¶¶ 3–11 (outlining the gambling regulation framework in Portugal).
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Portugal for the 2005–2006 season.161 Shortly thereafter, Bwin
and the Liga were fined for promoting, organizing, and
operating Internet gambling in contravention of the Portuguese
monopoly legislation. 162 The CJEU found the monopoly
legislation to be a restriction on the freedom to provide services,
but one that is justified in the pursuit of fraud prevention.163
Here, the CJEU highlighted the unique risks posed by online
gambling—namely, the lack of direct contact between
consumers and operators—and rejected the possibility of
mutual recognition.164
In 2010, the CJEU issued at least seven preliminary rulings
on gambling regulations in the European Union, commencing
with the rulings issued on the same day in June by the Second
Chamber.165 Ladbrokes Ltd. v. Stichting de Nationale Sporttolisator
concerned the British company’s operation of gambling via the
Internet in the Netherlands in contravention of the exclusive
monopoly granted to the non-profit De Lotto by Dutch law.166
Similarly, Sporting Exchange Ltd. (t/a Betfair) v. Minister van Justitie
concerned the British online gambling operator’s unsuccessful
attempt to procure a license in the Netherlands.167 Both rulings
found the monopoly grant to the non-profit De Lotto to be a
restriction on the freedom to provide services.168 Both rulings
also stated, however, that national authorities must be given a
margin of discretion, in the context of moral, religious, or
161. Id. ¶¶ 20, 25 (summarizing the online gambling operator Bwin’s actions at
issue).
162. Id. ¶ 26 (discussing the fines imposed on Bwin and the First Football Division
(“Liga”)).
163. Id. ¶¶ 54, 62–67, 73 (finding the regulations to be a restriction on the
freedom to provide services that is justified by the legislature’s cited objective of crime
prevention).
164. Id. ¶¶ 69–70 (finding that even though Bwin is licensed in another Member
State, Portugal is entitled to find this insufficient assurance that Portuguese consumers
would be protected against fraud and crime).
165. See Betfair, [2010] 3 C.M.L.R. 41.
166. Ladbrokes, [2010] 3 C.M.L.R. 40, ¶¶ 3–10 (describing the legal and factual
context of the dispute involving Ladbrokes and De Lotto).
167. Betfair, [2010] 3 C.M.L.R. 41, ¶¶ 10–20 (summarizing the dispute between
the Dutch De Lotto and the British Betfair gambling operator).
168. Ladbrokes, [2010] 3 C.M.L.R. 40, ¶ 16 (concluding that a monopoly regime
constitutes a restriction on the freedom to provide services); see Betfair, [2010] 3
C.M.L.R. 41, ¶ 24 (emphasizing that monopoly legislation is commonly found to
restrict free provision of services).
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cultural factors, to restrict gambling on the grounds of public
policy.169
Further, in Ladbrokes the CJEU again faced the question of
whether it is consistent for national authorities to employ an
expansionist policy in gambling operations while pursuing the
objective of crime prevention and reduction of gambling within
the Member State. 170 Here, the CJEU found that authorized
operators must be able to present a “reliable” and “attractive”
service in order to draw consumers away from illegal activity,
and therefore, controlled expansion of gambling operations can
be consistent with the Member State’s objectives.171 However,
the CJEU found it difficult to reconcile an expansionist policy
with the objective of protecting consumers and left this question
for the national court to determine. 172 Again, the Second
Chamber stressed the unique risks posed by online gambling,
and found the regulations proportionate to and justified by the
overriding objectives of crime and fraud prevention.173
In July 2010, the Fourth Chamber also issued a preliminary
ruling on gambling regulations in Sjöberg & Gerdin.174 In Sjöberg
& Gerdin, newspaper editors advertising in Sweden for online
gambling operators were found to be acting in violation of
Swedish law and were fined SEK 50,000 kr (approximately
US$6541). 175 The CJEU found the restriction on advertising
169. Ladbrokes, [2010] 3 C.M.L.R. 40, ¶¶ 17–20 (allowing restrictions on the free
provision of services in light of overriding reasons in the public interest); see Betfair,
[2010] 3 C.M.L.R. 41, ¶¶ 26-29 (justifying restrictions on the grounds of public policy,
public security, or public health).
170. Ladbrokes, [2010] 3 C.M.L.R. 40, ¶¶ 23–25 (citing the referring courts own
doubts regarding the consistency of an expansionist gambling policy with the objectives
on the record).
171. Id. ¶ 25 (holding that controlled expansion is justified when the expansion is
aimed at channeling gambling activity to regulated rather than clandestine operators).
172. Id. ¶¶ 26–38 (leaving the issue of consistency to the national court to
determine).
173. Id. ¶¶ 54–58 (noting the different liabilities posed by the online gambling
market sector and finding that in light of these differences, the contested restriction is
justified); see Betfair, [2010] 3 C.M.L.R. 41, ¶¶ 33–37, 60–62 (deferring to national
courts and legislatures regarding online gambling regulations due to the unique risks
posed by the activity).
174. Sjöberg & Gerdin, [2010] E.C.R. I-6921.
175. Id. ¶¶ 19–23 (describing the contested events in the main proceedings).
According to the Swedish court, the Swedish legislation sought to “counter criminal
activity; counter negative social and economic effects; safeguard consumer protection

1568 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:1525
necessary and justified because it was only ensuring that
consumers gamble within the authorized Swedish system.176 The
CJEU admonished the Swedish legislature for inconsistently
fining advertisers of unlicensed services more than the Swedish
operators.177 Here, the Fourth Chamber did not engage in an
analysis of the regulation’s proportionality or discriminatory
character, but rather left the matter to the national court to
determine.178
The CJEU here retreated from the vigorous analysis
employed in Gambelli, citing the unique risks posed by online
gambling. 179 These rulings marked a return to the lenient,
hands-off approach taken in earlier rulings like Schindler and
Läärä, and deferred much of the analysis to the national
courts. 180
Moreover, the CJEU did not engage in a
proportionality analysis in Sjöberg & Gerdin. 181 These rulings
were less faithful to the goals of the fundamental freedoms and
the internal market.

interests, [and] apply the profits from lotteries to objectives which are in the public
interest or socially beneficial.” Id. ¶ 5.
176. Id. ¶¶ 33–34, 39, 45 (stating that the restriction on the freedom to provide
services in the Kingdom of Sweden and advertising is justified as it furthers the
legislature’s objective of channeling gambling to regulated operators).
177. Id. ¶ 56 (chastising the Swedish legislature for potentially fining advertisers
of Swedish gambling activities less than advertisers of gambling in other Member
States).
178. Id. ¶¶ 55–57 (deeming the issue best left to the referring court to determine
if the regulations at hand are evenhanded and proportionate).
179. See Santa Casa, [2009] E.C.R. I-7633, ¶¶ 69–70 (rejecting the application of
mutual recognition in the face of the risks posed by online gambling to consumers); see
also Ladbrokes, [2010] 3 C.M.L.R. 40, ¶¶ 54–58 (concluding that the different risks
posed by online gambling justify the restriction); Betfair, [2010] 3 C.M.L.R. 41, ¶¶ 33–
37, 60–62 (allowing restriction on the free provision of services in light of the risks of
online gambling).
180. See SPORTS BETTING, supra note 2, at 29 (analyzing the Betfair, Ladbrokes, and
Sjöberg & Gerdin decisions to confirm dicta in Santa Casa, a case that “delivered a
significant blow to the private gaming sector,” regarding monopolies and other
restrictive policies in the Netherlands and Sweden); see also Verbeke, supra note 130, at
254 (calling the Santa Casa ruling a pendulum swing back to Schindler that has a low
burden of proof, ignores conflicts of interest, and too readily accepts the Portuguese
government’s argument); Doukas, supra note 60, at 244 (characterizing the CJEU as
“generally reluctant to engage in a rigorous review of the compatibility of national
licensing systems with the Treaty” and deferential to national courts).
181. Sjöberg & Gerdin, [2010] E.C.R. I-6921, ¶¶ 55–57 (leaving the determination
of nondiscrimination and proportionality to the national court entirely).
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III. NATIONAL REGULATION OF ONLINE GAMBLING SHOULD
FOLD IN FAVOR OF EU-WIDE REGULATION
Online gambling is uniquely extraterritorial in that national
borders are virtually nonexistent on the Internet. Thus, online
gambling escapes regulation and enforcement more easily than
conventional gambling.182 The differing national regulations of
the Member States have created legal uncertainty that many
online gambling operators have exploited through operations in
the grey market.183 Moreover, the online gambling market in the
European Union is rapidly growing at a rate of fifteen percent
and is broadly unregulated with roughly eighty-five percent of
online gambling websites unlicensed as of 2006.184 Thus, crime
prevention and consumer protection objectives, especially
protection of minors, are not being accomplished in the
regulation of online gambling.
First, the European Union must harmonize the differing
national regulations to properly combat the social risks
associated with online gambling. Online gambling is a
borderless activity, which calls for borderless solutions. Second,
the CJEU must continue to pursue infringement proceedings
brought by the Commission and to rigorously examine the
compatibility of national regulations on gambling with the
Treaty principles. The thorough analysis employed in GambelliPlacanica and revitalized by Carmen Media is a more appropriate
compatibility analysis than the highly deferential test used in
Santa Casa. 185 Moreover, the CJEU should continue on the
recent line of reasoning carried out in Stanleybet and encourage
Member States to either drastically reform the monopoly systems
182 . See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text (discussing the legal
uncertainty surrounding gambling regulation and the illegal market that has grown out
of said uncertainty).
183. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (estimating that in 2006 eighty-five
percent of active gambling websites operated without a license).
184. See supra notes 13–14, 22, 25 and accompanying text (estimating that the
online market currently grows at a rate of fifteen percent, that eighty-five percent of
operating websites were unlicensed in 2006, and outlining the lack of online gambling
specific regulation but citing a number of electronic commerce regulations that affect
the online gambling market).
185. See supra note 153 and accompanying text (affirming that Gambelli-Placanica
symbolized a movement towards a stricter analysis); see also supra note 155 and
accompanying text (describing the shockwave that Santa Casa sent across the
jurisprudence).
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or consider the consumer benefits of liberal licensing systems.186
The conflicting and inharmonious national regulations on
online gambling clearly are not achieving their stated objectives
of consumer protection and crime prevention.187 The European
Union needs to tackle the problem from a different angle—a
harmonized angle.
A. Minimum Harmonization in Online Gambling is Needed
Online gambling calls for legislative solutions. The
European Union’s legislative institutions should continue their
current dialogue and fulfill the objectives laid out in recent
communications and resolutions. 188 The reopening of
infringement proceedings against Member States whose
regulations unduly restrict free trade in the gambling market is a
step in the right direction.189 Regulation of online gambling
should be harmonized at the Community level, or at a minimum
common security standards should be crafted to protect against
online gambling by vulnerable consumers and minors.
Minimum harmonization that sets the floor for online gambling
regulation across the Union could better achieve consumer
protection by creating EU-wide age minimums and identity
checks. 190 This is an especially attractive option because
gambling regulation implicates so many social and moral policy
issues.191 Member States would be free to legislate above the
minimum standards and could become useful as policy labs.192

186. See supra note 123 and accompanying text (describing the implicit policy
recommendation the CJEU made in Stanleybet).
187. See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text (outlining the legal uncertainty
in the market and the number of online gambling websites operating without a
license).
188. See supra notes 63–73 and accompanying text (summarizing briefly recent
Parliament and Commission steps taken in the field of online gambling regulation).
189. See supra notes 68–71 and accompanying text (regarding the 2013 decision
for the Commission to reopen infringement proceedings).
190. See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text (explaining the differing
degrees of harmonization and the potential applicability of minimum harmonization to
the field of gambling regulation).
191. See supra notes 15–22 and accompanying text (describing the social risks
traditionally associated with gambling, specifically via the Internet).
192. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (giving an example of Member
States acting as policy labs in the environmental field).
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In the meantime, the CJEU should reconsider its explicit
rejection of the application of mutual recognition in gambling
regulation. The application of the principle of mutual
recognition could lead the way to EU-wide regulation. Mutual
recognition guarantees market access across the European
Union despite differing national regulations. 193 Due to the
political sensitivity of the issue and the large tax revenues at
stake, application of the principle may be difficult to achieve—
especially considering the fact that many Member States do not
want to increase competition in and availability of gambling
services.194
B. The CJEU Must Remain Committed to the Fundamental Freedoms
and Employ a Probing Analysis of National Restrictions on Gambling
Services
Until harmonization is politically feasible, the CJEU should
consistently apply the compatibility analysis it currently employs
to guarantee that the restrictions on the fundamental freedoms
are justified.195 The inconsistent approach the CJEU has taken in
examining gambling regulations to date has perpetuated and
perhaps invited the existing fragmentation and legal uncertainty
in the online gambling market. 196 Recently, the CJEU has
returned to a compatibility analysis that demands
proportionality and fully examines the national legislature’s
proposed justifications. 197 The CJEU must continue to
emphasize the importance of consistency and proportionality in
regulation. It is important that the CJEU continue to examine
the national legislatures’ objectives, as it did in Gambelli and

193. See supra notes 52–55 and accompanying text (discussing the principle of
mutual recognition, the equivalence it creates in the law, and the debate over applying
the principle to the field of gambling regulation).
194. See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text (criticizing the application of
mutual recognition in the gambling market).
195. See generally supra notes 105–08, 129–34, 152–54 (discussing the compatibility
analysis employed in Gambelli-Placanica and revitalized in Carmen Media).
196. See generally supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text (referring to the legal
uncertainty in the online gambling market).
197 . See supra notes 98–128 and accompanying text (detailing the trend
beginning in 2010 in the CJEU of employing searching and thorough analyses in
reviewing the compatibility of gambling regulations with the Treaty).
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Placanica, as economic protectionism can never serve as a
justification for restricting free trade.198
The CJEU should also continue to require support on the
legislative record that criminal activity or deterrence of
consumer addiction is significant enough to warrant strict
regulation as it did in Dickinger & Ömer and Zeturf.199 Even if
there are findings that support the stated objectives, the CJEU
must insist that the regulations are proportionate to, and
consistent with, these findings. The cloak of protective objectives
is often used as a pretense to support the economic benefits of
monopoly or licensing regulatory schemes actually pursued, as
seen in Dickinger & Ömer, Gambelli, Placanica, and, most recently,
Pfleger.200 As always, the CJEU must not allow discrimination on
the basis of national origin or place of establishment, as it
reaffirmed in Costa & Cifone and Engelmann.201
Moreover, in Stanleybet the CJEU recently advocated for the
more liberal licensing permit scheme over the monopoly model
of regulation.202 This policy stance is a remarkable change from
Carmen Media, which was itself a landmark case that supported
liberalization of the market, where the CJEU stated that a
monopoly could be found suitable and necessary. 203 The
language in Stanleybet is stronger, and the CJEU makes a policy
recommendation to the Greek legislature either to reform the
current monopoly system or to recognize that a liberalized
licensing system may better protect consumers against addiction
and fraud. 204 If all the Member States employed a licensing
198. See supra notes 132–54 and accompanying text (summarizing the series of
cases, beginning with Gambelli, that more closely examined the national legislature’s
objectives than in Schindler or Santa Casa).
199. See supra note 115 and accompanying text (calling for legislative support for
restrictive measures imposed on gambling in the cases Dickinger & Ömer and Zeturf).
200. See supra notes 115–16, 127, 136–37, 148 and accompanying text (citing cases
where the CJEU found or should find inconsistency in the stated ends and the
employed means: Dickinger & Ömer, Pfleger, Gambelli, and Placanica).
201 . See supra notes 109, 112–13 and accompanying text (re-establishing
vigorously that regulations may not discriminate on the basis of nationality).
202. See supra note 123 and accompanying text (briefly summarizing the CJEU’s
implicit policy recommendation in Stanleybet).
203. See supra notes 105–06 and accompanying text (finding that a monopoly in
Germany potentially could be found suitable and consistent).
204. See supra notes 123–25 and accompanying text (recommending that the
Greek government either overhaul the monopoly system or liberalize).
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permit scheme, then mutual recognition could more effectively
apply. Furthermore, the CJEU could find online gambling is
sufficiently distinguishable from conventional gaming to warrant
a separate judicial analysis that acknowledges the inherent crossborder nature of the activity.
If the European Union continues to leave the analysis of
online gambling regulations that restrict free trade to the CJEU,
then the CJEU must carefully police these regulations to prevent
economic balkanization and maintain market access. To this
end, the CJEU should continue to engage in a thorough analysis
of proportionality and consistency when examining the means
and the ends of Member States’ online gambling regulation.
CONCLUSION
The current unregulated state of online gambling in the
European Union and the web of conflicting regulations in the
Member States actively contributes to the confusion, potentially
allowing operations by unscrupulous operators. Moreover, these
unregulated websites create undesirable risk to minors and
individuals with gambling addictions. Ultimately, a system of EUwide regulation is the most appropriate solution to issues in a
market that spans the European Union. Until such a system can
be achieved, the CJEU should continue to insist on a thorough
analysis of Member States’ regulations by evaluating the
proportionality and non-discriminatory nature of such
regulations. Member States should also heed the CJEU’s
decision in Stanleybet: either overhaul monopoly systems or
liberalize the market by instating a licensing system.
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